

**NORTH SLOPE
SUBAREA CONTINGENCY PLAN**

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BACKGROUND: PART ONE - SUPPORT INFORMATION

A. SUBAREA DESCRIPTION

This Subarea Contingency Plan (SCP) supplements the Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases (the Unified Plan). The SCP in conjunction with the Unified Plan describes the strategy for a coordinated federal, state and local response to a discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil or a release of a hazardous substance from a vessel, offshore facility, or onshore facility operating within the boundaries of the North Slope Subarea. For its planning process, the federal government has designated the entire state of Alaska as a planning "area." The State of Alaska has divided the state into ten planning regions of which one is the North Slope Region. As part of the Unified Plan, this SCP addresses the North Slope region or subarea.

This plan shall be used as a framework for response mechanisms and as a pre-incident guide to identify weaknesses and to evaluate shortfalls in the response structure before an incident. The plan also offers parameters for vessel and facility response plans under OPA 90. Any review for consistency between government and industry plans should address the recognition of economically and environmentally sensitive areas and the related protection strategies, as well as a look at the response personnel and equipment (quantity and type) available within the area (including federal, state, and local government and industry) in comparison to probable need during a response.

As defined by Alaska regulations, the North Slope Region is the area of the State encompassed by the boundaries of the North Slope Borough, including adjacent shorelines and state waters, and having as its seaward boundary a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. Figure 1 depicts this area.

The region is located between the Brooks Range and the Arctic Ocean (to include the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas) and can be characterized as rolling tundra, barren, and treeless. Other mountain ranges in the region include the Davidson, Philip Smith, Endicott, and the DeLong mountains. Permafrost underlies the entire region.

Portions of the region are in the arctic, transitional, and continental climatic zones. The weather in the region is the result of the interaction between global air movements, land topography, and major weather systems that move north-south and east-west across the Bering Sea. Summer temperatures average 40° F. Winter temperatures average -17° F, but frequently yield much lower chill factors due to high winds. Winters also include periods of 67 days without daylight. The sun sets on November 18 and does not rise until January 24. The region is also arid with annual precipitation averaging less than 5 inches. The North Slope oil fields and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) occupy the eastern half of the region.

The larger river basins in the region include the Canning, Sagavanirktok, Colville, Ikpikpuk, Kuk, and Utukok rivers. Marine waters associated with the region are comprised of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. Sea ice formation in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas begins in October, and the ice pack persists through late June, although the ice begins to melt and break up in April. The entire marine area of the region lies within the continental shelf.

There are a total of 10 villages in the region, 8 Native and 2 non-Native (Deadhorse and Cape Lisburne). Delivery of noncrude oils are made to these villages primarily by barges operating from Dutch Harbor or Cook

Inlet. Deliveries are ice dependent, and do not occur as ice forms.

Human activities in the Arctic Region revolve around the subsistence, sport, and commercial uses of fish and wildlife. Oil and gas development and production on the arctic coastal plain has provided the primary source of wage employment and government funds. Infrastructure development is minimal by national standards, except within the developed oil fields.

The North Slope region encompasses a vast area that has relatively limited risks in some respects, but elevated risks when considering certain factors. The North Slope has a very small population covering thousands of square miles. The number of facilities storing, handling, and transferring refined products is very small. These facilities typically provide fuel mainly for the generation of electricity and heating homes. The fuel is also used to power vehicles and vessels which are relatively few in number as well. Tank barges provide fuel to these facilities no more than twice each year and only during the short open-water season. Numerous exploratory and production wells exist in the region and produce a large amount of crude oil which is piped above ground to processing facilities before being shipped through the Trans Alaska Pipeline to Valdez.

Numerous hazards are inherent in the transportation, storage, exploration development and production of petroleum products. The impact of these hazards can be lessened or avoided completely through proper operations. The shoreline geomorphology of this region does not present a hazard to the integrity of a vessel. Most of the shorelines fall into some type of sand/gravel/cobble combination, peat, tidal flats, or vegetated shores.

The operating season is very short in this region because of the late ice breakup and the early freeze-up of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Vessels have been damaged by ice which is an ever present concern. The movement of ice, whether during freeze-up, breakup, or in the dead of winter can produce great stresses on vessels and structures. An improperly engineered structure could sustain damage in this harsh environment. Currents and sea states in the Beaufort and Chukchi are not extreme and will generally pose little risk. However, storm surges could pose a substantial risk to shoreline cleanup operations and personnel. Strong storms and high winds are unusual during the period when vessels are transiting the region.

As with all areas within Alaska, the North Slope region supports a wide range of wildlife. During the season when the North Slope is thawed, the inland and shoreline areas are a haven for migratory waterfowl and other birds. Local communities rely on marine mammals as a traditional food source in the coastal communities and these mammals are present in concentrated areas during certain times of the year. Polar bears roam the ice pack and are susceptible to oiling as are almost all of the other mammals, birds, and fish in the region. Residents of the North Slope primarily engage in a subsistence lifestyle and rely heavily on the availability of the resources in the area. Any spill of significance could devastate their food harvest and seriously threaten their normal means of existence. Any long term impacts to their food resources could have a disastrous impact on their way of life. The Sensitive Areas Section provides detailed information on the specific resources and their locations in the region.

The highest probability of spills of refined products occurs during fuel transfer operations at the remote villages. Historically, the occurrence of spills from facilities during these operations is not significant. Spills of refined product that enter the water will rapidly disperse and evaporate making cleanup difficult. Crude oil will be affected by the same natural degradation factors but to a much lesser degree. Crude oil spills will be persistent and will require aggressive actions and innovative techniques in the harsh Arctic environment. Spills that occur in the Beaufort Sea will tend to flow from East to West according to the currents and the predominant winds. Beaufort Sea spills will, therefore, typically not be driven ashore immediately and impacts

reaching the shoreline can be expected to be spread over a larger area rather than experiencing higher levels of impact along a shorter area. Spills in the Chukchi will typically be carried away from shore. This does not mean that any spill can be anticipated to have no shoreline impacts; spills rarely behave as "planned." Shoreline impacts should be expected and planned for.

Spills in the Arctic require careful preplanning to overcome the effects imposed by the environment. Resources at risk during the summer months are much greater in species and number than those in the winter months. Summer daylight increases the available work hours to allow almost continuous operations. The extended daylight does not, however, increase the number of hours a particular individual can safely perform his task. The severe stresses imposed by operating in winter conditions in periods of darkness will seriously reduce individual efficiency over a given period. The severe weather does not always produce a negative effect, but can produce a positive effect at times. Ice and snow can act effectively as barriers to impede the spread of oil and can be used effectively to hold and contain oil. Techniques for organizing spill response in arctic environments have been developed and numerous reference documents detail these procedures.

FIGURE 1

NORTH SLOPE REGION



The oil industry is quite active in the North Slope region. The subarea includes onshore and offshore crude oil production facilities, major crude oil and non-crude oil storage, and pipeline facilities. Most activities are concentrated in the Prudhoe Bay area, but other oil production activities extend westward to Oliktok Point. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System originates at Prudhoe Bay and two of the Pump Stations are located in the North Slope subarea. Offshore platforms are also located in the Beaufort Sea. Refined products are stored in tank farms at the oil production facilities and in the local communities.

The major highway system servicing the area is the Dalton Highway which extends from Fairbanks to Prudhoe Bay.

B. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

This Subarea Contingency Plan covers the region outlined above in subpart A. The USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) is the predesignated FOSC for the Coastal Zone which encompasses all navigable waters seaward of the mean high tide line and an area of shoreline 1,000 yards inland of the coastline. The Environmental Protection Agency is the predesignated FOSC for the Inland Zone which encompasses all lands, rivers, streams, and drainages inland of the 1000-yard wide band which parallels the Alaskan coastline. These zones are clearly defined in the Unified Plan. It is possible that incidents may occur in locations that do not fall under federal jurisdiction and there will be no FOSC in these instances.

The State of Alaska places jurisdiction of spill response for the North Slope subarea under the Northern Alaska Response Team (NART) of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. The SOSC for the NART is the predesignated SOSC for the entire North Slope subarea.

Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA) exist between the USCG and EPA, the USCG and the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), and EPA and ADEC which further delineate agency and OSC responsibilities. **Annex K of the Unified Plan** includes copies of these MOUs/MOAs.

C. MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION COMMITTEE

A regional Multiagency Coordination Committee (MAC) will normally be activated for significant incidents which involve resources under the jurisdiction of several agencies. Unlike the MAC defined in the ICS of the National Interagency Incident Management System, regional MACs for spill response do not play a direct role in setting incident priorities or allocating resources. The MAC can advise the Unified Command (through the Liaison Officer) and provide comments and recommendations on incident priorities, objectives and action plans.

Figure 2 provides the general location of the regional MAC in relation to the Unified Command organizational structure. Additionally, the suggested/potential membership of the MAC is provided in Figure 2. Membership on the MAC is dependent upon the location of the incident and the interests or jurisdiction of the affected communities, landowners, and special interest groups. Agencies/organizations that are functioning as part of the overall ICS response structure should not provide redundant representation on the RMAC.


During incidents where there is no FOSC, federal agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities for resources at risk could participate as members of the RMAC, thus retaining their input on containment, oversight, and cleanup. However, the preferred approach is to include these agencies as part of the overall ICS structure.

As indicated above, the MACs are not directly involved in tactical operations, though some of its members may be. The MACs' role is to convey to the Unified Command information relating to the authority, concerns and expertise of its members. It recommends to the Unified Command overall objectives and priorities and reviews the Incident Action Plans.

MAC activities will be coordinated by the Liaison Officer. MAC discussions will be documented and recommendations and dissenting opinions will be communicated to the Unified Command through the Liaison Officer. The MAC will be chaired initially by the Liaison Officer. After convening, the MAC will then elect its own chair.

Senior Leaders of Impacted Communities: An alternative to the RMAC for communities impacted by a major spill may include the establishment of a group consisting of senior leaders of impacted communities. The group should have direct access to the ADEC Commissioner or his/her representative.

Figure 2
North Slope
Regional Multiagency Coordination Committee



Suggested Membership:

- Representatives or Community Emergency Coordinators from affected communities. These may include:
 - North Slope Borough
 - Nuiqsut
 - Atqasuk
 - Lisburne
 - Wainwright
 - Point Lay
 - City of Barrow
 - Anaktuvuk Pass
 - Point Hope
 - Deadhorse
 - Kaktovik
- Federal/state/local or private landowners and leaseholders (e.g., National Parks Service, Alaska Dept of Natural Resources)
- Native corporations, organizations and communities
- Representatives from federally-recognized tribes
- Special interest groups affected by the incident

D. SUBAREA COMMITTEE

The primary role of the Subarea Committee is to act as a preparedness and planning body for the subarea. The primary membership of the Subarea Committee is composed of the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinators (EPA and the Coast Guard) for the subarea, and the pre-designated State On-Scene Coordinator from the Department of Environmental Conservation. A representative from the North Slope Borough may also serve as a member of the North Slope Subarea Committee. Each member is empowered by their own agency to make decisions on behalf of the agency and to commit the agency to carrying out roles and responsibilities as described in this plan and the Unified Plan.

The predesignated Federal On-Scene Coordinators for the area (EPA & USCG) will serve as chairpersons of the committee. They will select work group members and provide general direction and guidance for the work groups and the Subarea Committee. The FOSC should solicit the advice of the Alaska Regional Response Team to determine appropriate work group representatives from federal, state and local agencies.

The Subarea Committee is encouraged to solicit advice, guidance or expertise from all appropriate sources and establish work groups as necessary to accomplish the preparedness and planning tasks. Work Group participants may include facility owners/operators, shipping company representatives, cleanup contractors, emergency response officials, marine pilot associations, academia, environmental groups, consultants, response organizations and federal, state and local agency representatives.

Subarea Committee Members

The North Slope Subarea Committee is comprised of representatives from the following federal, state and local agencies:

- U.S. Coast Guard, COTP Western Alaska
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
- Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
- North Slope Borough

The North Slope Subarea Committee also seeks advice and expertise concerning environmental and economic issues from Federal, State and local agencies and private industries such as:

- Department of the Interior
- Alaska Department of Fish and Game
- Alaska Department of Natural Resources
- Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
- North Slope Borough
- Alaska Clean Seas
- British Petroleum
- ARCO
- Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
- North Slope Borough Local Emergency Planning Committee
- Federally-recognized tribes

Subarea Working Groups

The North Slope Subarea Committee has formed the following Working Groups:

The Sensitive Areas Working Group is chaired by the Department of Interior, Office of Environmental


Policy and Compliance representative. This group will coordinate the preparation of the necessary information for each separate subarea and will ensure that the information is submitted in a common format. Participation by local community staff is vital to acquire local input and validate existing information. The North Slope subarea-specific sensitive areas information has been prepared and incorporated into the Sensitive Areas section of this plan.

The Logistics Working Group is co-chaired by representatives from the US Coast Guard, EPA, and ADEC. This Working Group is responsible for preparing the Resources Section of this plan.

The Operations Working Group is co-chaired by representatives from the Coast Guard, ADEC and the EPA. This working group is responsible for scenario development and the refinement/expansion of the Emergency Notification Lists and the Response Checklists located in the Response Section of this plan..

FIGURE 3

**PLANNING ORGANIZATION
NORTH SLOPE SUBAREA CONTINGENCY PLAN**



BACKGROUND: PART TWO - RESPONSE POLICY AND STRATEGIES

The strategy for responding to a specific spill or hazmat incident depends upon numerous factors. The strategy can change as the situation changes. As a general rule, the strategies listed below should be used as a guide in developing an effective response. Consider all factors that may affect the particular situation and revise/modify/expand these priorities as the situation dictates. The strategies are further delineated in the procedures and checklists contained in the Response Section, Parts Two and Three. Additional information can be found in **the Unified Plan**.

The Alaska Clean Seas Technical Manual provides specific tactics, strategies, and the resources necessary to support a given strategy. See the Geographic Response Strategies Section (ACS Technical Manual, Quick Reference Section) for a summary of the tactics, response strategies, and maps contained in the technical manual.

A. FEDERAL RESPONSE ACTION PRIORITIES/STRATEGIES

The following priorities are general guidelines for response to a pollution incident within the COTP Western Alaska zone. They are based on the premise that the safety of life is of paramount importance in any pollution incident, with the protection of property and the environment, although important, being secondary. Nothing in this part is meant to indicate that higher priority items must be completed before performing a lower priority task. They may be carried out simultaneously or in the most logical sequence for each individual incident.

Priority One - Safety of Life - for all incidents which may occur, the safety of personnel, including response personnel, must be given absolute priority. No personnel are to be sent into an affected area without first determining the hazards involved and that adequate precautions have been taken to protect personnel.

Priority Two - Safety of Vessel/Facility and Cargo - the facility and/or vessel and its cargo shall become the second priority.

Priority Three - Protection of the Environment by elimination of the pollution source - containment and recovery of oil in the open water must be effected expeditiously to preclude involvement of the beaches and shorelines. Due to remote locations and restricted accessibility, it is extremely difficult to protect the majority of the coastline by diversion or exclusion methods. Therefore, securing the source and open water containment and recovery is especially critical and should normally be the first line of defense to protect the environment. Likewise, spills which occur on land or in upland water courses will be dammed, boomed, diked, etc., as feasible to prevent the spread of the pollutant downstream. NOTE: In-situ burning (Annex F for checklist) of a vessel and its pollutant may be an alternative considered by the OSC which places environmental protection priorities above saving the vessel and its cargo.

Priority Four - Protection of the Environment by diversion/exclusion, dispersion, or in-situ burning. In the event that the location of a spill or the weather conditions do not permit open water recovery, protection of the shoreline becomes paramount, especially areas of greatest sensitivity. It is not possible to protect some areas entirely or even in part. It may be necessary to sacrifice some areas in order to achieve the best overall protection of the environment. The OSC may consider *in situ* burning as a response option. Refer to **the Unified Plan** for an *in situ* burning checklist. The use of dispersants must be considered early in the response

phase while the oil is in the open water. Subpart J of the NCP and **the Unified Plan (Annex F)** address in detail the responsibilities of the OSC in the use of chemicals.

Priority Five - Protection of the Environment by beach cleanup and the use of Sacrificial Areas. It may not be possible to protect the entire shoreline from oil. In fact, it may be allowed purposely to come ashore in some areas as an alternative to damaging others. Selection of the proper shoreline cleanup technique depends on many different factors including the following:

- Type of substrate
- Amount of oil on the shoreline
- Depth of oil in the sediment
- Type of oil (tar balls, pooled oil, viscous coating, etc.)
- Trafficability of equipment on the shoreline
- Environmental or cultural sensitivity of the oil shoreline
- Prevailing oceanographic and meteorological conditions

The best way to minimize debate over the most appropriate response is to involve all interested government and private agencies. The shoreline assessment groups shall attempt to agree on the amount and character of the oil that is on the shorelines, anticipate interactions between the stranded oil and the environment, and the geological and ecological environment of the involved shorelines. Once a consensus is met, a process is necessary to determine the proper treatment required.

Shoreline cleanup options may include the use of physical and/or chemical processes. Chemical shoreline cleanup products may increase the efficiency of water-washing during the cleanup of contaminated shorelines. However, the product must be listed on the EPA National Contingency Plan Product Schedule and authorization must be obtained from the ARRT and the government on-scene coordinator at the spill. Physical shoreline cleaning methods include techniques such as: natural recovery, manual sorbent application, manual removal of oiled materials, low pressure flushing (ambient temperature), vacuum trucks, warm water washing, high pressure flushing, manual scraping, mechanical removal using heavy equipment. Bioremediation is also considered as a shoreline cleaning method. Bioremediation is the application of nutrients to the shoreline to accelerate the natural biodegradation of oil. The OSC shall request the RRT to provide site-specific guidelines for source protection measures required during shoreline cleanup operations.

B. STATE OF ALASKA RESPONSE PRIORITIES

1. **Safety:** Ensure the safety of persons involved, responding, or exposed to the immediate effects of the incident.
2. **Public Health:** Ensure protection of public health and welfare from the direct or indirect effects of contamination of drinking water, air, and food.
3. **Environment:** Ensure protection of the environment, natural and cultural resources, and biota from the direct or indirect effects of contamination.
4. **Cleanup:** Ensure adequate containment, control, cleanup and disposal by the responsible party or supplement or take over when cleanup is inadequate.
5. **Restoration:** Ensure assessment of contamination and damage and restoration of property, natural resources and the environment.
6. **Cost Recovery:** Ensure recovery of costs and penalties to the Response Fund for response, containment, removal, remedial actions, or damage.

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BACKGROUND: PART THREE - SUBAREA SPILL HISTORY

A. NAVIGABLE WATERS SPILL HISTORY

The North Slope subarea experiences a limited amount of vessel traffic, primarily resupply barges and fuel barges. Response to major spills in this subarea is further compounded by the relatively short ice-free periods on the open ocean. Many crude oil development and production platforms also operate in the Prudhoe Bay offshore area.

The probability of a major oil spill exists due to the volume of oil product transported in the region as well as produced in the region.. Listed below is a brief synopsis of significant spills in the region. A complete list is available through ADEC.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Aug 1988	Tanker 570; 68,000 gallons of arctic heating fuel; no product recovered.

B. INLAND SPILL HISTORY

The North Slope planning region has a limited road system. The major community in the region (aside from the oil production facilities) is Barrow. The region includes a major portion of the crude oil production activity in the state. With limited access by air, water and road, a major spill in the region would present severe logistical problems for spill responders.

A fair number of releases occur in this region due to the industrial/commercial nature of the crude oil production process. Listed below is a brief synopsis of significant releases of hazardous substances in the region. This information was collected from the ADEC spill database. A complete list is available through ADEC.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Jun 3, 1971	BP side of ARCO airfield; 45,000 gallons of aviation fuel spilled.
Jan 5, 1972	BP side of ARCO airfield; 20,000 gallons of diesel spilled (human error).
Jan 1, 1981	Check Valve 23, faulty valve; 84,000 gallons of crude oil.
May 7, 1981	Mile 5 TAPS; 10,000 gallons of diesel (cause unknown)
Aug 22, 1981	COTU Fuel Storage Tanks; 18,900 gallons of diesel; faulty connection.
Oct 31, 1982	Diesel Storage Tank (PBOC), Prudhow Bay; 8,400 gallons of diesel; tank overtopped.
Jul 28, 1983	NSB Service Area #10; 7,550 gallons of gasoline; ruptured line.
Aug 14, 1983	Mile 11.5 Dalton Highway, truck accident; 7,000 gallons of diesel.
Aug 29, 1983	Mile 125, Dalton Highway; truck accident; 8,350 gallons of diesel.
Jun 2, 1985	Prudhoe Bay PBOC; leak; 10,000 gallons of crude oil.
Nov 14, 1985	Prudhoe Bay Fuel Terminal; valve left open; 10,500 gallons of gasoline.
Nov 15, 1985	CPF Holding Pit, Milne Point; faulty valve; 7,350 gallons of crude oil.
Apr 25, 1988	Atqasuk; 10,000 gallons of diesel.
Jun 16, 1988	Barrow Tank Farm; Faulty valve; 10,000 gallons of diesel.
Jul 28, 1989	CPF Milne Point; 38, 850 gallons of crude oil.
Aug 25, 1989	Drilling Site 2U; leak; 25,200 gallons of crude oil.

Jan 31, 1990	Anaktuvuk Pass Power Plant; ruptured line; 100,000 gallons of diesel.
Dec 10, 1990	Drilling Site L5; explosion; 25,200 gallons of diesel.
Jun 17, 1991	NE Point Lay Tank Farm; 6,000 gallons of diesel.
May 24, 1994	Wainwright City (School District pipeline), line ruptured; 10,000 gallons of diesel.
Mar 10, 1995	East Prudhoe Bay (Prudhoe Bay Storage), line ruptured; 3,000 gallons of diesel.
Aug 16, 1995	Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (North Slope, Remote GV #53), faulty valve, 2,843 gallons of propane.
Jan 31, 1996	Point Lay (U.S. Air Force Long Range Radar Site, PMC Frontec), bulk storage tank, line ruptured, 2,200 gallons of diesel.
Apr 17, 1996	Prudhoe Bay (BP Exploration), corrosion in 6" line, 6,300 gallons of crude oil.
Jun 12, 1996	Barrow (MarkAir Tank Farm), leak, 3,000 gallons of aviation fuel.
Jun 30, 1996	West Prudhoe Bay (BP Exploration, Mukluk Pad), puncture in storage tank, 1,100 gallons of diesel.
Jul 6, 1996	Wainwright City (North Slope Borough), valve left open, 4,000 gallons diesel.
Mar 26, 1997	16 Well 18; line ruptured; 4,746 gallons of crude oil.
May 19, 1997	Pad 10; leak; 7,560 gallons of diesel.
Nov 11, 1997	Dalton Highway; Truck overturned; 5,217 gallons of diesel.

HAZMAT RELEASE HISTORY

Dec 8, 1981	Dowell Pad, Prudhoe; 700 gallons of acid.
Jul 22, 1990	Schlumberger Pad; 7,200 gallons of acid.
Oct 12, 1996	Barrow (NOAA), intentional release of 500 pounds of ammonia from compressed gas cylinders.

BACKGROUND: PART FOUR - ACRONYMS

AAC	Alaska Administrative Code
ACFT	Aircraft
ACP	Area Contingency Plan
ACS	Alaska Clean Seas (North Slope industry cooperative)
ADCED	Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development
ADEC	Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
ADF&G	Alaska Department of Fish and Game, also as ADFG
ADMVA	Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
ADNR	Alaska Department of Natural Resources
ADOT&PF	Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, also as ADOTPF
AFB	Air Force Base
AIR	Air Operations
AK ANG	Alaska Army National Guard
ALCOM	Alaska Command
ANSC	Alaska North Slope Crude oil
ANWR	Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
APSC	Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
ARRT	Alaska Regional Response Team
AS	Alaska Statute, also Air Station (USAF)
ASAP	As soon as possible
BBLs	Barrels
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
BOA	Basic Ordering Agreement
BOPD	Barrels of Oil per Day
BP	British Petroleum
BPX WOA	British Petroleum Exploration Western Operations Area
CAH	Central Arctic Herd (caribou)
CAMEO	Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations
CCGD 17	Commander, Coast Guard District 17
CEMP	Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
COM	Communications equipment/capabilities
COMDTINST	Commandant Instruction (USCG)
COTP	Captain of the Port (USCG)
CP	Command Post
C-Plan	Contingency Plan
CTAG	Cultural Technical Advisory Group
CUL	Cultural Resources
DAA	Documentation/Administrative Assistance
DES	Division of Emergency Services (a division under ADMVA)
DOD	Department of Defense
DOI	Department of the Interior
DOI-FWS	Department of the Interior – Fish and Wildlife Service
DRAT	District Response Advisory Team
DRG	District Response Group

ECRT	Emergency Communications Response Team (ADMVA)
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
ENV	Environmental Unit Support
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency, also as USEPA
ESI	(Alaskan) Environmental Sensitivity Index
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FIN	Finance
FIR	Fire Protection/fire fighting
F/V	Fishing Vessel
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FLIP	Flight Information Publication
FNSB	Fairbanks North Star Borough
FOG	Field Operations Guide
FPN	Federal Pollution Number
FOSC	Federal On-Scene Coordinator
FWPCA	Federal Water Pollution Control Act
GIS	Geographic Information System
GSA	General Services Administration
HAZ	Hazmat
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials, also as hazmat
HAZWOPER	Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
HQ	Headquarters
IC	Incident Commander
ICS	Incident Command System
IDLH	Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite Organization
JPO	Joint Pipeline Office (gov't agencies involved with managing/regulating TAPS)
LAT	Latitude
LEG	Legal
LEPC	Local Emergency Planning Committee
LEPD	Local Emergency Planning District
LERP	Local Emergency Response Plan
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LO	Liaison Officer
LONG	Longitude
LOSC	Local On-Scene Coordinator
LRRS	Long Range Radar Station
MAC	Multiagency Committee
MAP	Mapping
MAR CH	Marine Channel
MED	Medical Support/Health Care
MESA	Most Environmentally Sensitive Area
M/V	Motor Vessel
MLC	Maintenance and Logistics Command (USCG Pacific Area)
MLT	Municipal Lands Trustee Program
MOA	Memoranda of Agreement, also Municipality of Anchorage

MOU	Memoranda of Understanding
MSD	Marine Safety Detachment (USCG)
MSO	Marine Safety Office (USCG)
MSRC	Marine Spill Response Corp. (national industry cooperative)
NART	Northern Alaska Response Team
NCP	National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan
NIIMS	National Interagency Incident Management System
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOTAMS	Notice to All Mariners; also, Notice to Airmen
NPDES	National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
NPFC	National Pollution Fund Center
NRC	National Response Center
NRT	National Response Team
NRDA	(Federal/State) Natural Resource Damage Assessment
NSB	North Slope Borough
NSF	National Strike Force
NSFCC	National Strike Force Coordinating Center
NWR	NOAA Weather Radio
OHMSETT	Oil and Hazardous Material Simulated Environment Test Tank
OOD	Duty Officer
OPA 90	Oil Pollution Act of 1990
OPCEN	Operations Center
OPS	General Response Operations, also Office of Pipeline Safety (U.S. DOT)
OSC	On-Scene Coordinator
OSHA	Occupational Health and Safety Administration
OSLTF	Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
OSRO	Oil Spill Response Organization
O/S	On-Scene
PCH	Porcupine Caribou Herd
PIAT	Public Information Assist Team
PIO	Public Information Officer
PL	Private Line
PLN	General Planning Operations
POLREP	Pollution Report (USCG)
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RAC	Response Action Contractor
RCC	Rescue Coordination Center
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1978
RMAC	Regional Multi-Agency Coordination Committee
RP	Responsible Party
RPOSC	Responsible Party On-Scene Coordinator
RPD	Recovery, Protection and Decontamination
RQ	Reportable Quantity
RRT	Regional Response Team
RV	Recreational Vehicle

SAR	Search and Rescue
SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SCP	Subarea Contingency Plan
SEC	Security
SHPO	State Historic Preservation Officer (ADNR)
SITREP	Situation Report (ADEC)
SONS	Spill of National Significance
SOSC	State On-Scene Coordinator
SS	Technical Expertise/Scientific Support
SSC	Scientific Support Coordinator (NOAA)
STORMS	Standard Oil Spill Response Management System
SUPSALV	U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage, also as NAVSUPSALV
TA	Trajectory Analysis
TAPS	Trans Alaska Pipeline System
TLH	Teshekpuk Lake Herd (Caribou)
T/V	Tank Vessel
USAF	United States Air Force
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VOSS	Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System
VPSO	Village Public Safety Officer
VTS	Vessel Traffic System
WAH	Western Arctic Herd (Caribou)
WRR	Wildlife Protection/Care/Rehabilitation/Recovery
WX	Weather