BACKGROUND: PART ONE - SUPPORT INFORMATION

A. SUBAREA PLAN

This Subarea Contingency Plan (SCP) supplements the *Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases* (the Unified Plan). The SCP in conjunction with the Unified Plan describes the strategy for a coordinated federal, state and local response to a discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil or a release of a hazardous substance from a vessel, offshore facility, or onshore facility operating within the boundaries of the Cook Inlet. This plan shall be used as a framework for response mechanisms and as a pre-incident guide to identify weaknesses and to evaluate shortfalls in the response structure before an incident. The plan also offers parameters for vessel and facility response plans under OPA 90. Any review for consistency between government and industry plans should address the recognition of economically and environmentally sensitive areas and the related protection strategies, as well as a look at the response personnel and equipment (quantity and type) available within the area (including federal, state, and local government and industry) in comparison to probable need during a response.

B. SUBAREA DESCRIPTION

For its planning process, the federal government has designated the entire state of Alaska as a planning "region" and the western half of the state, of which Cook Inlet is a portion, as a planning "area." The State of Alaska has divided the state into ten planning "regions" of which one is the Cook Inlet Region. As part of the unified planning process, this SCP addresses the Cook Inlet area or region, and to avoid any confusion in terms, the region is referred to as the Cook Inlet Subarea.

The Cook Inlet Subarea encompasses the boundaries of the Kenai Peninsula Borough, the Municipality of Anchorage, and the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, including adjacent shorelines, waters of Cook Inlet and waters having as their seaward boundary a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from which the territorial sea is measured. Figure 1 depicts this area.

Cook Inlet is a large, elongated body of water oriented in a SW-NE direction in southcentral Alaska. It is approximately 150 miles long and its width ranges from about 10 miles between the East and West Forelands to approximately 80 miles between the Kenai Peninsula and the mouth of the McNeil River in Kamishak Bay. It has the second largest tidal fluctuations in the world, frequently exceeding twenty feet, with tidal current velocities as fast as 8 knots (Sienkiewicz et al, 1992). Tidal flats are a dominant coastal feature in Cook Inlet, although marshes, rocky shores, sand and gravel beaches, and wave-cut platforms are also quite common along the coastline.

Sea ice is normally present in upper Cook Inlet from December through March, and occasionally from November to as late as April (NOAA, 1977). In winter, 100 percent ice coverage may be found in some areas in upper Cook Inlet, but substantial amounts of ice may be present as far south as Kamishak Bay (NOAA, 1977).

The prevailing winds in Cook Inlet are generally from the north and northeast during the fall, winter, and spring, with common speeds between 0 and 11 knots. Southerly winds, conversely, are more frequent during the summer months (NOAA, 1977).

NOAA navigational charts indicate the depths in Cook Inlet range between 30 and 60 fathoms (180 and 360 feet) in the lower portion of the Inlet, between 20 and 30 fathoms (120 and 180 feet) in the middle section (between Anchor Point and the Forelands), and between 5 and 15 fathoms (30 and 90 feet) in the upper portion of the Inlet. However, the charts also indicate the presence of reefs, mud flats, and shoals along the middle section of Cook Inlet, particularly around Kalgin Island and near Trading Bay. Hydrographic surveys have indicated a net inflow of relatively clear, saline water from the Gulf of Alaska along the eastern side of the lower Inlet, while relatively fresh, silt-laden water flows out the Inlet on the west side.

Figure 1: THE COOK INLET SUBAREA

There are many tidal rips in Cook Inlet, including three major ones which are persistently found east of Kalgin Island between Anchor Point and the Forelands. These major tide rips are known as the East Rip, the Mid-Channel Rip, and the West Rip (See Figure 2). A tide rip, as defined by David Burbank in Environmental Studies of Kachemak Bay and Lower Cook Inlet (1977), is a:

> "frontal zone (separating different water masses) along which convergence of surface water occurs. Such convergence generally results in the more dense water mass flowing underneath the less dense, leaving floating debris behind at the surface and thereby producing the accumulations of debris found along the rips. These zones of convergence are also normally accompanied by considerable horizontal shear, manifested by sharply differing current velocities on either side of the frontal zone. The major rips (frontal zones) thus constitute natural tracers delineating the boundaries between differing surface currents."

Tide rips are significant features of Cook Inlet that can affect an oil spill response, for not only do they vary throughout a 24-hour period, but they extend from north of the Forelands to lower Cook Inlet. In fact, the dominant rip, the Mid-Channel Rip, may extend as far south as Shelikof Strait. The Mid-Channel Rip, in the region south of Ninilchik, generally forms the dividing line between clear oceanic water in the eastern inlet and the relatively fresh, silt-laden water in the western inlet (Burbank, 1977). During flood tides, these rips strengthen, and debris is consolidated by the strong surface water convergence, especially along the major rips. Along the zone of the Mid-Channel Rip, a turbulent region of boiling water and large waves is produced. The intensity of the convergence is such that the roaring noise produced by the turbulence can be heard up to 1/4 nautical mile away. Fishing nets and logs are sometimes observed to be pulled under, surfacing again some distance away. During ebb tide, however, the energy is reduced, allowing for collected debris to be spread out as far as 1 ½ nautical miles (3 km). This debris can be entrapped for days in this cycle.

Figure 2: Major Tide Rips (Frontal Zones) in Lower Cook Inlet

The dashed lines indicate where the rips are weak or obscure. The bathymetry shows only the 10 fathom (20 m) depth contour.

(Source: Burbank, David C., 1977. Circulation Studies in Kachemak Bay and Lower Cook Inlet. Vol. 3 of Environmental Studies of Kachemak Bay and Lower Cook Inlet. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Marine/Coastal Habitat Management.)

The oil industry is quite active in the Cook Inlet Subarea. Most activities are concentrated in the East Forelands area, between Kenai and Nikiski, and along Trading Bay, between West Foreland and North Foreland. Offshore platforms are also located in Trading Bay and in the upper portions of Cook Inlet. Several submerged pipelines cross the Inlet in this area as well. Refined products are stored in tank farms in Anchorage and other areas of upper Cook Inlet. The area includes onshore and offshore crude oil production facilities, major crude oil and non-crude oil storage, and terminal facilities in Anchorage, Nikiski, and Redoubt Bay.

The region also contains the southern half of the Alaska Railroad system which transports passengers and cargo, including oil and hazardous substances, from Seward and Whittier to Anchorage and Fairbanks. The majority of the State's highway system is also located in this region with major roadways linking Anchorage with communities to the south on the Kenai Peninsula and to the north in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough and beyond.

C. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

This Subarea Contingency Plan covers the region outlined above in subpart B. The USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) is the predesignated FOSC for the Coastal Zone which encompasses all navigable waters seaward of the mean high tide line and an area of shoreline 1,000 yards inland of the coastline. The Environmental Protection Agency is the predesignated FOSC for the Inland Zone which encompasses all lands, rivers, streams, and drainages inland of the 1000-yard wide band which parallels the Alaskan coastline. These zones are clearly defined in the Unified Plan. It is possible that incidents may occur in locations that do not fall under federal jurisdiction and there will be no FOSC in these instances.

The State of Alaska places jurisdiction of spill response for the Cook Inlet Subarea under the Central Alaska Response Team (CART) of the Department of Environmental Conservation. The SOSC for the CART is the predesignated SOSC for the entire Cook Inlet Subarea.

Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA) between the USCG/USEPA and the USEPA/ State of Alaska further delineate the OSC responsibilities. **Annex K of the Unified Plan** includes copies of these MOUs/MOAs.

D. MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION COMMITTEE

A regional Multi-agency Coordination Committee (MAC) will normally be activated for significant incidents which involve resources under the jurisdiction of several agencies. Unlike the MAC defined in the ICS of the National Interagency Incident Management System, regional MACs for spill response do not play a direct role in setting incident priorities or allocating resources. The MAC can advise the Unified Command (through the Community Liaison Officer) and provide comments and recommendations on incident priorities, objectives and action plans.

Figure 3 provides the general location of the regional MAC in relation to the Unified Command organizational structure. Additionally, the suggested/potential membership of the MAC is provided in Figure 3. Membership on the MAC is dependent upon the location of the incident and the interests or jurisdiction of the affected communities, landowners, and special interest groups. During incidents where there is no FOSC, federal agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities for resources at risk could participate as a member of the MAC, thus retaining their input on containment, oversight, and cleanup.

As indicated above, the MACs are not directly involved in tactical operations, though some of its members may be. The MACs' role is to convey to the Unified Command information relating to the authority, concerns and expertise of its members. It recommends to the Unified Command overall objectives and priorities and reviews the Incident Action Plans.

MAC activities will be coordinated by the Community Liaison Officer. MAC discussions will be documented and recommendations and dissenting opinions will be communicated to the Unified Command through the Liaison Officer. The MAC will be chaired initially by the Community Liaison Officer. After convening, the MAC will then elect its own chair.

Figure 3

Cook Inlet
Regional Multi agency Coordination Committee



Suggested Membership:

- Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council
- Representatives or Community Emergency Coordinators from affected communities. These may include:
  - Palmer
  - Wasilla
  - Kenai
  - Seward
  - Seldovia
  - Cooper Landing
  - Kachemak
  - Port Graham
  - Big Lake
  - Willow
  - Anchorage
  - Nikiski
  - Soldotna
  - Homer
  - Girdwood
  - Moose Pass
  - Ninilchik
  - Talkeetna
  - Nanwalek
  - Houston
- Federal/state/local or private landowners and leaseholders (e.g., National Parks Service, Alaska Dept of Natural Resources)
- Native corporations, organizations and communities
- Special interest groups affected by the incident

* The Local On-Scene Coordinator is part of the Unified Command and the Incident Commander during an incident as long as there is an immediate threat to life, health and safety.

E. REGIONAL CITIZENS ADVISORY COUNCIL

The Cook Inlet Regional Citizens' Advisory Council (RCAC) is a local citizens group with an Oil Pollution Act of 1990-mandated role in Cook Inlet spill response activities. In this role, the RCAC participates in the emergency operations center and monitors on-water activities during a spill. The RCAC has four primary tasks to perform during a spill: observe, verify, inform, and advise.

By observing and verifying emergency spill response and cleanup efforts, the RCAC is able to properly inform local residents, communities and concerned groups. The RCAC also provides information on local knowledge and concerns to incident commanders that can prove valuable to operational decisions. The RCAC is a resource for the Unified Command and participates in the regional MAC when it is established and functioning for a spill response.

Specific responsibilities of the RCAC include:

- Providing a voice for local communities and citizens in the policies and decisions that affect them.
- Advising the oil industry and the public on oil spill prevention and response, and ways to mitigate the environmental impact of terminal, offshore oil facilities, and tanker operations.
- Monitoring terminal, tanker, and offshore oil facilities operations and implementation of spill prevention and response plans.
- Increasing public awareness of private oil industry's current capabilities in spill prevention and response, and the environmental impacts of oil transportation.
- Fostering long term partnership between industry, government and local communities.
- Conducting independent research.
- Participating in, monitoring, and critiquing actual spill responses, spill drills, deployment exercises, and spill simulations conducted by industry. The RCACs also assist industry and regulatory agencies in drill planning and post-drill evaluations.
- Preparing and maintaining an RCAC Emergency Response Plan outlining the Council's role and operating procedures in the event of a major spill.

F. SUBAREA COMMITTEE

The primary role of the Subarea Committee is to act as a preparedness and planning body for the subarea. The Subarea Committee consists of the predesignated FOSCs and SOSC for the subarea and, depending upon the event or the issues to be addressed, local government representatives . Each member is empowered by their own agency to make decisions on behalf of the agency and to commit the agency to carrying out roles and responsibilities as described in this plan and the Unified Plan. The predesignated Federal On-Scene Coordinators for the area (EPA & USCG) will serve as chairpersons of the committee.

The Subarea Committee is encouraged to solicit advice, guidance or expertise from all appropriate sources and establish subcommittees as necessary to accomplish the preparedness and planning tasks. Subcommittee participants may include facility owners/operators, shipping company representatives, cleanup contractors, emergency response officials, marine pilot associations, academia, environmental groups, consultants, response organizations and representatives from regional citizens advisory councils.

Subarea Committee Members
The Cook Inlet Subarea Committee is comprised of the following:

U.S. Coast Guard, COTP Western Alaska
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
Kenai Peninsula Borough
Matanuska-Susitna Borough
Municipality of Anchorage

The Cook Inlet Subarea Committee also seeks advice and expertise concerning environmental and economic issues from local agencies and private industries such as:

Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co.
Unocal Corporation
Alaska Railroad Corporation
Cook Inlet Spill Prevention and Response Inc.
Alaska Chadux Corporation
Local Emergency Planning Committees
Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Alaska Department of Natural Resources
Alaska Department of Military and Veteran Affairs
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Forest Service
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Marine Fisheries Service

Subarea Work Groups

The Cook Inlet Subarea Committee relies on the input from the three work groups listed below. The Subarea Committee welcomes interested participants to serve on work groups in accordance with each individual's area of expertise and the particular needs of the work groups.

The Sensitive Areas Work Group is chaired by a representative from the Department of Interior

The Logistics Work Group is chaired by a representative from the ADEC.

The Operations Work Group is chaired by a representative from the U.S. Coast Guard.

Membership on the work groups can vary and fluctuate but the list below provides some of the regular participants:

Matanuska-Susitna Borough
Kenai Peninsula Borough
Municipality of Anchorage
representatives from LEPCs and other local governments
Alaska Railroad Corp.
Alaska Chadux Corp.
CISPRI
Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council
Tesoro Corp.
Unocal Corp.
Crowley Maritime
Forty-Niner Remediation and Oilspill Group
Representatives from other industry and commercial concerns
U.S. Coast Guard, COTP Western Alaska
USCG 17th District
U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment Kenai
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Interior
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Forest Service
National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Alaska Department of Natural Resources
Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

BACKGROUND: PART TWO - RESPONSE POLICY AND STRATEGIES

The strategy for responding to a specific spill or hazmat incident depends upon numerous factors. The strategy can change as the situation changes. As a general rule, the strategies listed below should be used as a guide in developing an effective response. Consider all factors that may affect the particular situation and revise/modify/expand these priorities as the situation dictates. The strategies are delineated in the Checklists contained in the Response Section, Part Two.

A. Federal Response Priorities

1. Protect human life and health
2. Minimize ecological impacts
3. Minimize economic and public impacts

B. Response Strategies

1. Determination of appropriate countermeasures
2. Determination of natural collection areas and boom sites throughout the area
3. Determination of containment techniques
4. Determination of removal techniques
5. Determination of shoreline cleanup techniques/strategies
6. Determination of environment cleanup techniques/strategies

C. State of Alaska Response Priorities

1. Safety
2. Public Health
3. Source Mitigation
4. Environment
5. Cleanup
6. Restoration
7. Cost Recovery

BACKGROUND: PART THREE - AREA SPILL HISTORY

A. NAVIGABLE WATERS SPILL HISTORY

Cook Inlet supports a wide variety of vessel traffic ranging from the smallest fishing vessel to crude oil tankers. Refined products and crude oil are routinely shipped in and out of the Inlet. In addition, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tankers call at the Kenai Pipeline dock facility. Many crude oil development and production platforms also operate in the area. Crude oil and natural gas pipelines exist in Cook Inlet and Turnagain Arm in several locations.

Numerous probabilities exist for spills to occur due to the volume of oil product transported in the region. Listed below is a brief synopsis of significant spills in the region from 1987 to present. A complete list is available through ADEC.

Date	Incident
02 July 87	T/V Glacier Bay, Kenai Up to 210,000 gallons of North Slope crude released.
22 June 88	Mystery spill, Pickworth Dock, Anchorage Approximately 300 gallons refined product released.
18 July 88	M/V Cindy Lee, Jackalof Bay, Homer Approximately 100 gallons diesel released.
05 Aug 88	Mystery spill, Upper Cook Inlet Approximately 100 gallons of heavy product released.
02 Nov 88	M/V Alaska Constructor, Trading Bay, Upper Cook Inlet Heavy sheening resulted from an explosion aboard the vessel. Potential release of approximately 10,000 gallons gasoline and 30,000 gallons of diesel fuel.
14 Nov 88	Marathon Spark Platform, Upper Cook Inlet Approximately 420 - 840 gallons barrels Cook Inlet crude released.
12 Dec 88	T/V Oriental Crane, Nikiski Approximately 7,644 gallons of Bunker C spilled.
31 Jan 89	Amoco Platform Anna, Upper Cook Inlet Approximately 4,620 gallons crude oil spilled.
19 Aug 89	M/V Lorna B, Upper Cook Inlet Vessel sank with 80,000 gallons diesel on board - not recovered.
17 Dec 90	T/V Coast Range, Cook Inlet Approximately 630 gallons crude oil released
01 Aug 91	Port Graham fuel facility, Cook Inlet

	Unknown quantity of diesel fuel.
13 Aug 91	M/V Atlantic Seahorse, Cook Inlet Approximately 4000 gallons diesel released.
04 Jan 92	KPL dockside spill, KPL Dock, Upper Cook Inlet Approximately 1700 gallons of oily ballast water released when ballast water pipeline froze.
26 Apr 92	ARCO King Salmon Platform, Upper Cook Inlet Approximately 336 - 420 gallons crude oil released.
28 Aug 92	F/V Loon, Outer Kenai Coast Approximately 1,470 gallons diesel released.
05 Dec 95	Tesoro Tank Farm (Nikiski). Approximately 2,500-2,900 gallons of c rude oil released due to a mechanical failure. Some of the product escaped secondary containment and entered Cook Inlet.
25 Jan 97	Crowley Barge Oregon capsized six miles offshore of Ninilchik. The barge was struck by a tug, became unbalanced after taking on water, and overturned. The entire cargo of urea (approximately 12,500 tons) was lost.

B. INLAND SPILL HISTORY

The Cook Inlet planning region supports a well-developed road and rail system that connects many of the region's communities. Major communities include the Municipality of Anchorage and surrounding communities, the cities of Kenai and Soldotna on the Kenai Peninsula, and Wasilla and Palmer in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough. The region includes the majority of industrial activity in the state as well as the majority of the state's population. With access by water, rail and road, the Port of Anchorage is a major trans-shipment point. The Kenai Peninsula supports much of the Cook Inlet oil production activity as well as refinery and urea production facilities.

Numerous releases occur in this region due to the industrial/commercial nature of the area. Listed below is a brief synopsis of significant releases of hazardous substances in the region from 1989 to present. This information was collected from the ADEC spill database. A complete list is available through ADEC. (Note: the urea formaldehyde release of 1986 is included because of its significant size and the state emergency response it precipitated.)

Date	Incident
27 Feb 86	Alaska Railroad, Crown Point transfer station near Moose Pass. A tank car of urea formaldehyde was accidentally heated twice in Anchorage before its trip south to Crown Point. The manufacturer of the chemical was contacted and expressed no alarm at the situation. However, the chemical went through an exothermic reaction and began venting the product shortly after arrival at Crown Point. The area was evacuated and, over the course of approximately two days, 50 tons of urea formaldehyde was released.
13 Mar 89	Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company. Spill of <2 tons SO_2 due to a false indication from a high level shutdown mechanism which caused a shutdown of hydrocracker unit.
14 Mar 89	Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company. Release of <2 tons SO_2 emissions due to HEA power outage.
March 89	Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company. Release of <1 ton ammonia to the air. A shutdown of sulphur recovery unit caused release.
25 May 89	Unocal, Chemical plant. Pressure release of 6,500 pounds of ammonia vapor. Specific cause not listed.
21 Jun 89	Unocal, Chemical plant. Release of 600 pounds of ammonia to the air. Ammonia dissipated to air. Cause: Unocal was tearing down the system and replacing indicator. By the end of June 1989, Unocal's ammonia releases were being addressed under RCRA compliance agreement. Further releases regulated under this agreement.
15 Nov 89	ARCO, Swanson River 41-33. Three barrels of 15% hydrochloric acid spilled during acidizing job. The acid ate a hole in the line. Soda spread on gravel to

neutralize the acid. The contaminated gravel was taken to a solid waste facility (location was not specified).

03 Dec 89	Unocal, Chemical plant. 100 pounds of ammonia released to the air and onto ground. Cause was a lost gasket.
29 Jan 90	VECO, at Swanson facility. While filling a truck-mounted tank, 21 gallons of xylene tinted with crude and water spilled. The xylene burped out of vent pipe onto ground. Contaminated soil and snow collected and transported to a waste pit.
01 Mar 90	Cook Inlet Pipeline, Drift River Terminal. Approximately 2,000 barrels of crude oil spilled within a containment dike. No oil was released to the water and no injuries were sustained as a result of this incident.
20 Mar 90	Unocal, Chemical plant, on the wharf. An unknown amount of sulfuric acid (estimated at 65 gallons) spilled due to leak in off-loading line.
30 Jun 90	Unocal, Chemical plant. 500 gallons of sulfuric acid spilled while off-loading an acid line. The hose became loose while clearing an improperly blocked-off line.
14 Sep 90	Tesoro, North Kenai Plant. Just under one ton of sulfur released into the atmosphere as a result of a power shutdown.
16 Aug 91	Shell Western ENP (onshore, Nikiski). Approximately 2,000 barrels of crude oil spilled on the ground. Report did not specify details of spill.
07 Sep 91	Unocal, Chemical plant. 2,670 pounds of hot ammonia released during transfer to a storage tank as a result of a pressure overload and subsequent venting for a duration of 15 minutes.
11 Sep 91	OSI/Great Western Chemical. 100 gallons of sodium hypochlorite (12.5% NaOCl by volume, pH 11.4) released while off-loading from truck. The 250 gallon plastic chemical tote fell off forklift which caused the tip to split. The incident occurred 100 feet from the water.
27 Nov 91	Dowell-Schlumberger. Approximately 70-80 gallons of 15% hydrochloric acid (HCl) released at the shop yard. Specific details were not listed.
10 Jul 92	Union, Chemical plant. Approximately 5,400 pounds of ammonia were released for 40 minutes due to operator error/mechanical failure at No. 5 plant.
03 Aug 93	Unocal, Chemical plant. At 2200 hours, 1500 pounds of anhydrous ammonia released due to malfunctioning valve in area plant.
17 Sept 93	Unocal, Kenai plant. 100 gallons of sodium hydroxide (unspecified concentration) released from a pinhole leak.

22 Feb 95	Whittier, Defense Fuels Supply Center. 113,000 gallons of JP-5 (jet fuel) released, but contained within the lined, diked containment area. Cause of the release was a severed pressure relief line (the line was severed by a chunk of falling ice).
28 Jul 95	East Kenai, Unocal Swanson River Field. 840 gallons of crude released from a ruptured line.
08 Jun 96	Kenai Unocal Chemical Plant. 8943 pounds of anhydrous ammonia released. Cause unknown.
18 Jun 96	Kenai Unocal Chemical Plant. 6006 pounds of anhydrous ammonia released. Cause unknown.
02 May 97	Anchorage International Airport. Over 3000 gallons of Jet A fuel released after a backhoe struck a buried 2" valve.
17 Jul 97	Elmendorf Air Force Base. 13,600 gallons of jet fuel (JP-8) released from a ruptured six-inch buried pipeline.

BACKGROUND: PART FOUR - ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

ACP	Area Contingency Plan
ACS	Alaska Clean Seas (North Slope industry cooperative)
ADEC	Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
ADF&G	Alaska Department of Fish and Game, also as ADFG
ADNR	Alaska Department of Natural Resources
ADOT&PF	Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, also as ADOTPF
AFB	Air Force Base
ANSC	Alaska North Slope Crude oil
ARRT	Alaska Regional Response Team
BBLS	Barrels
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
BOA	Basic Ordering Agreement
CART	Central Alaska Response Team (ADEC)
CCGD 17	Commander, Coast Guard District 17
CISPRI	Cook Inlet Spill Prevention and Response Inc. (industry cooperative)
COTP	Captain of the Port (USCG)
CTAG	Cultural Technical Advisory Group
DOD	Department of Defense
DOI	Department of the Interior
DRAT	District Response Advisory Team (USCG)
DRG	District Response Group (USCG)
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency, also as USEPA
ESI	(Alaskan) Environmental Sensitivity Index
F/V	Fishing Vessel
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FOSC	Federal On-Scene Coordinator
GIS	Geographic Information System
GSA	General Services Administration
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials, also as hazmat
HAZWOPER	Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
ICS	Incident Command System
IDLH	Immediate Danger to Life and Health
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite Organization
JPO	Joint Pipeline Office (gov't agencies involved with managing/regulating TAPS)
LEPC	Local Emergency Planning Committee
LEPD	Local Emergency Planning District
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MAC	Multiagency Committee
M/V	Motor Vessel
MLT	Municipal Lands Trustee Program
MOA	Memoranda of Agreement
MOU	Memoranda of Understanding
MSO	Marine Safety Office (USCG)
MSRC	Marine Spill Response Corp. (national industry cooperative)
NART	Northern Alaska Response Team (ADEC)
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology

NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOTAMS	Notice to All Mariners; also, Notice to Airmen
NPDES	National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
NPFC	National Pollution Fund Center
NRC	National Response Center
NRT	National Response Team
NRDA	(Federal/State) Natural Resource Damage Assessment
NSF	National Strike Force
NSFCC	National Strike Force Coordinating Center
NWR	NOAA Weather Radio
OHMSETT	Oil and Hazardous Material Simulated Environment Test Tank
OPA 90	Oil Pollution Act of 1990
OPCEN	Operations Center
OSC	On-Scene Coordinator
OSRO	Oil Spill Response Office
PIAT	Public Information Assist Team
PIO	Public Information Officer
POLREP	Pollution Report (USCG)
PWS	Prince William Sound
RCAC	Regional Citizens Advisory Council
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1978
RP	Responsible Party
RRT	Regional Response Team
RV	Recreational Vehicle
SART	Southeast Alaska Response Team (ADEC)
SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SCP	Subarea Contingency Plan
SERVS	Ship Escort Response Vessel Service (for Alyeska terminal in Valdez)
SHPO	State Historic Preservation Officer (ADNR)
SITREP	Situation Report (ADEC)
SONS	Spill of National Significance
SOSC	State-On Scene Coordinator
SSC	Scientific Support Coordinator (NOAA)
SUPSALV	U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage, also as NAVSUPSALV
TAPS	Trans Alaska Pipeline System
T/V	Tank Vessel
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VIRS	Visual Information Response System
VTS	Vessel Traffic Separation System/Scheme