

Southeast Alaska Gov't-Led Area Exercise 2003 Lessons Learned Attachments

OBSERVATION:

ICS training that overviewed the processes which crossover section lines at the unit/branch level of a unified command would have been valuable to the participants of the command post exercise (e.g. supporting/maintaining the situation display, tracking resources in-the-field/at-staging/in-route, providing electronic inputs to the joint website, maintaining documentation records, etc.). This training is especially important for large responses, which involve joint staffs.

DISCUSSION:

Information exchange at the unit/branch leader level of the unified command was impaired due to a general lack experience in ICS and the resulting inability to anticipate information sharing needs between the sections/units. Participants were aware of their roles and responsibilities within their particular unit; however, there was confusion as to how best to provide timely information updates to other units.

Several participants did take part in formal classroom ICS training prior to the exercise, however the training was primarily focused at the section chief level and the planning process for developing an Incident Action Plan.

There are limited opportunities for the response community to exercise together as a whole. This exercise provided a good mechanism for highlighting challenges faced by responders who staff multi-agency command posts.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

During the exercise participants addressed the communication challenges by designating points of contact between units to further facilitate communication flow. The situation improved as the drill progressed and information needs were handled in a proactive rather than a reactive manner.


For example, the resource and situation units initially had a difficult time posting up-to-date information with regard to resources in the field. The main source for their troubles appeared to be the lack of direct communications with the field. Operation did have direct communications with the field (and were being provided hourly updates); however, this information was not known/provided to the resource and situation units.

The resource and situation units worked around this issue by eventually sending field observers to the field (control room) to report information directly back to them. While this worked well for the exercise scenario, since road access would have been available, in other scenarios it might not be an option. Another solution could have been simply getting the information from the operations section.

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RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- SEAPRO, in conjunction with its member companies, regularly conducts Incident Management Team (IMT) training in Southeast Alaska. Recommend instructors be encouraged to expanded their training curriculum to cover awareness of supporting/maintaining the situation display, tracking resources in the field/staging/ordered, providing electronic inputs to the joint website, maintaining documentation records, etc.
- Recommend State and Coast Guard responders continue to take every opportunity to participate in SEAPRO training events.
- The ICS training that was coordinated during the planning of this exercise (i.e. MATES) was very beneficial to the participants who were able to attend. Recommend that similar training be conducted for the planning of future PREP Area exercises. Also recommend that the training be expanded to cover awareness of the above issues.
- Recommended that CGD17 (DRAT) and SEAPRO look at the possibility of developing team building training, similar to MATES, to cover the out-years between Area exercises (PREP Area exercises occur once every 3 years in Southeast Alaska) and other locations in Southeast Alaska.



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OBSERVATION:

Formalization of air monitoring procedures for the Juneau harbor area needs to be completed. In addition, general guidelines should be developed for other areas of Southeast Alaska.

DISCUSSION:

During the exercise it was determined that the responding agencies did not have a good understanding of the capabilities for performing air monitoring in the Juneau area. The Delta Western Facility Response Plan calls for the local Fire Department to perform these operations, however the Juneau Fire Department does not have adequate equipment or trained personnel.

ADEC has some monitoring equipment for responder protection. However it was recognized that during an actual response state responders would not be able to effectively perform air monitoring for the public (i.e. since they have a small staff and would be heavily involved in the unified command and equipment deployment).

It was noted that public concern related to health threats associated with a release would likely be focused on the odor threshold of the product, even if no hazard were present. A large diesel spill, as scripted for this exercise, is a good example of such a case (i.e. the odor threshold is well below the hazard threshold). Therefore the public would need clear information to explain why they weren't in danger even though they would be able to smell the spill.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

The unified command consulted with the NOAA scientific support coordinator to quickly determine that there would not have been a public health hazard for this scenario (i.e. a near-by cruise ship with several thousand tourists and the downtown shopping area). However, the low odor threshold of diesel was identified as a potential issue for public concern and courses of actions were discussed to demonstrate to the public that the responding agencies were looking out for their welfare.

Conducting air monitoring to verify that no hazard existed and disseminating clear information were identified as critical steps for success. Unfortunately the participants were not able to locate any pre-planned guidelines to assist them in this effort.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Per FOSC and SOSC request, it is recommended that the Southeast Subarea Committee (for the SEAK Subarea Contingency Plan) develop guidelines to address the issues discussed above. SEAPRO should be included in the development of the guidelines.
- Following the development of the guidelines, recommended that the Alaska Unified Plan and Delta Western C-plan be updated as appropriate.

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OBSERVATION:

A tailored resource ordering process should be developed for SEAPRO member companies, which is specific to SEAPRO's equipment and joint spill response requirements.

DISCUSSION:

N/A.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

The resource ordering process and the locally developed Incident Command System (ICS) 222 form [i.e. the Resource/Materials Request/Order Form as described in the Alaska Incident Management System (AIMS) guide on page E-9] posed difficulties for participants during the exercise.

The required information and signature approvals for the 222 forms were not widely known by the participants in the exercise. As a result logistics received order forms from the planning and operations sections that were largely incomplete.

During the course of the drill, exercise participants were eventually successful in working out a resource ordering process with clearer guidelines for the draftees. One such guideline was that the finance section chief needed to approve any request over \$1,000 before logistics could place the order.

Within the logistics section the 222 form did not lend itself to dividing orders between its branches and units (i.e. orders for the communications unit were intermixed on the same 222 form with orders for the supply unit and vessel support unit). Copies were made to appropriately divide-up the orders, however this created an additional paper management and tracking challenge.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that SEAPRO develop a standardized resource ordering process for their members that will meet the needs of a joint response organization. Procedures and forms that are already in use may be of assistance (e.g. current SEAPRO member agency procedures, Alaska Clean Seas' (ACS') Resource Ordering Approval Process, Tesoro multi-copy color-coded forms, etc.).
- Recommend that SEAPRO and CGD17 DRAT develop a training program for local responders on the standardized ordering process and use of applicable forms.

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OBSERVATION:

The process for resource tracking and display needs to be improved.

DISCUSSION:

Resource tracking during the initial stages of a response is always a challenge since the field response team is already conducting operations, staging areas are being established, and lots of orders are in the works.

In order for a clear picture to emerge out of the fray, the resource unit must quickly establish information feeds from lots of different sources within the command post and the field. As information is collected it must be displayed in an organized, timely, and accurate manner. In addition consistent feedback must be sought and utilized to maintain accuracy.

Concurrently responders outside the resource unit (e.g. the operations section) must take the initiative to provide periodic updates for the resources they are directing and/or ordering. Participants in the resource unit have an impossible task without support from the other units within the unified command.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

Resource tracking during the exercise appeared to be slow in getting started, which seemed to stem from initial problems with information sharing at the unit/branch levels within the unified command.

The multiple display methods utilized by the resource unit and the additional display maintained by the operations section also added confusion for other participants. Participants were unsure of that they were looking at and whom they should provide feedback to.

The Planning Section Chief and Resource Unit Leader eventually decided on one display process and communicated this process to the rest of the unit.


A great deal of time was spent hand writing t-cards and additional staffing was added to the resource unit to assist with filling out the cards.

As the exercise progressed the resource unit became more proactive in requesting information (e.g. they sent a field observer to the simulated field operations to get an accurate picture of resources on scene).

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RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that SEAPRO, MSO Juneau, and ADEC develop pre-printed t-cards for their pre-positioned equipment and contracted resources. In addition “oiled” response information should be included on each card to further facilitate their use (i.e. the fire service t-cards include a lot of unnecessary documentation fields). These cards could be provided to the MSO and/or SEAPRO members for inclusion in their command post “go-kits” for use during future responses and/or exercises. Developing these cards should streamline the start-up process for the resource unit.
- The unified command recommend that resource tracking be maintained in one location only (i.e. operations should utilize the resource unit to track resources).
- Where possible, recommend placing the operations section between the situation unit and resource unit so communications are easier to establish and maintain.
- Recommend that SEAPRO identify t-card requirements and links to their resource ordering process (e.g. as logistics completes 222 form orders, t-cards should be generated and passed on to the resource unit.).



AGENCY	ST	TF	KIND	TYPE	I.D. NO./NAME
ORDER/REQUEST NO.			DATE/TIME CHECK IN		
HOME BASE					

AGENCY	ST	TF	KIND	TYPE	I.D. NO./NAME
INCIDENT LOCATION			TIME		
STATUS					
<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED		<input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST		<input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS.	
<input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE		<input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH		<input type="checkbox"/> ETR	
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INCIDENT LOCATION			TIME		
STATUS					
<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED		<input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST		<input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS.	
<input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE		<input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH		<input type="checkbox"/> ETR	
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NOTE					

ICS 219-7 (Rev. 4/02) DOZERS NPES 1348

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OBSERVATION:

Section chiefs did not fully understand their responsibilities with respect to the Alaska Implementation Guidelines (AIG) for the Programmatic Agreement on the Protection of Historic Properties.

DISCUSSION:

The AIG does not include guidance that links implementation requirements to the standard Incident Command System (ICS) planning process/cycle.

Recent experience with implementation during small spills has demonstrated that the guidelines appear to be adequate for the FOSCs and their staffs.

However, during a large event, especially in the case of a joint staff, the lack of additional clarification with regard to section level responsibilities may lead to problems. Once activated the steps of implementation will likely be delegated to the appropriate sections within the ICS structure of the unified command.

For example:

- a. The operations section chief should ensure that attachment 4 to the guidelines (or a suitable alternative) is released to the field response team for the initial operational period and that it is included in operation briefings for follow-on operational periods.
- b. The planning section chief and/or environmental unit leader need to establish an early relationship with the Historic Property Specialist (HPS) to ensure that the planning cycle schedule is discussed and that the HPS's findings/updates are received at appropriate times.
- c. The finance section chief also needs to be kept aware of the costs associated with the initial activation and follow-on recommendations for support.

In addition the training requirements for a certified HPS (i.e. attachment 3 to the guidelines) do not include the requirement for demonstrating an understanding the ICS planning cycle (i.e. HPS input is needed to support the tactics and planning meetings in order for the incident action plan (IAP) to be completed within the current operational period).

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

An overview of the guidelines and a discussion of section specific responsibilities were provided to the planning section prior to the exercise. Unfortunately, time constraints didn't allow for additional briefings to other sections of the unified command.

Due to some confusion with the Incident Commanders' (ICs) coaches and evaluation/control staff, the guidelines were not activated by the FOSC during the

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exercise (i.e. with respect to simulating the activation of an HPS in accordance with the CG's basic ordering agreement {BOA} and delegating tasks to the section chiefs as discussed above).

The planning section however took the initiative to provide a copy of attachment 4 to the ICs, which was signed and delivered to the operations section for dissemination to the field response team. Planning also discussed how inputs from the HPS would have been included in their planning cycle.


Initially there was some confusion in the operations section with regard to what to do with the signed attachment 4. Consequently it was set aside for inclusion with the 204s, which were being developed for the next operational period. Fortunately, the planning section followed up on the issue and operations eventually faxed the attachment to the field response team for the current operational period.


The finance section did not review the CG BOA or incorporate anticipated costs in its cost documentation.

For the Incident Action Plan (IAP) a copy of attachment 4 was attached to each 204 for the next operational period.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that DOI work with FOSCs to develop clearer implementation guidelines as discussed above.
- Recommend that the AIG and Alaska Unified Plan be updated as appropriate.

Address  <http://www.achp.gov/NCP-PA.html>



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National Contingency Plan Introduction ➔ NCP PA Text

Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties During Emergency Response Under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan

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OBSERVATION:

For a scenario of this scale, the incident commanders (ICs) recognized the need for having dedicated documentation support to capture their discussions and decisions regarding key issues.

DISCUSSION:

For important policy issues discussion notes would be invaluable for defending the decision making process which was followed by the ICs.

For most spills an administrative assistant should be adequate.

Based on the complexity and potential impact of the response, it was noted that the ICs' documentation recorder might need to be a qualified stenographer.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

Noted at debrief.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that the planning section ensure that the documentation unit provide a dedicated administrative assistant/stenographer to the ICs. If the ICs' discussions may have future legal implications it is recommended that a stenographer be contracted and/or the discussions be recorded in audio.
- Recommended that the resource section of the SEAK Subarea Contingency Plan be updated to include stenographer and audio recording equipment contracting information.

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OBSERVATION:

Guidelines for managing a joint unified command website need to be developed to ensure timely and accurate posting of information.

DISCUSSION:

The utilization of websites for external affairs has proven to be very effective in actual responses.

A website can be quickly posted from pre-designed templates which ADEC has developed. The unified command can populate the site with information such as photographs, situation reports, public service announcements, press releases, etc.

One of the benefits of an informative website is that the unified command usually receives fewer calls for basic information about the spill.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

ADEC provided a dedicated webmaster and computer support to the JIC for the exercise. Within the first hour the site was activated and the webmaster began to request information for posting.

Initially there were delays with receiving approval for release of information to the website. As the exercise progressed the decision to delegate approval authority to the information officer was made to expedite the process.

In addition, the flow of electronic information from the sections of the unified command was minimal (i.e. situation reports, fact sheets, mapping information). As a result several of the pages on the website were not populated with information.

In spite of the difficulties encountered, the unified command website was considered by the participants to be a valuable tool for disseminating information to the public and other government agencies.

The website address for the exercise was: www.state.ak.us/dec/seak03

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About this Drill Site Map
The State of Alaska find

CITY/BOROUGH OF JUNEAU
ALASKA'S CAPITAL CITY

Delta Western, Inc.
ALASKA'S PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTOR

Unified Command Website

Southeast Alaska Area Exercise • May 14, 2003 • Juneau, Alaska

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Next Press Briefing:
May 14, 3:30pm
Unified Command Center

Drill Home

Location	Juneau, Alaska
Product/Quantity	approximately 40,000 gallons of diesel fuel
Cause	under investigation
Time/Date of Spill	0630 am, Wednesday, May 14, 2003

Current Status:

At 0630 am on Wednesday, May 14, a Sea Coast fuel barge was in the process of transferring diesel fuel at the Delta Western Facility. An initial assessment reveals that the main marine header failed, allowing discharge of approximately 40,000 gallons of fuel.

Disclaimer SPAR Programs DEC State of Alaska

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend developing guidelines for website management, content, and releasing authority for a large command post. Section chiefs should be made aware of electronic data requirements and be encouraged to be proactive in providing periodic updates.
- Recommend continuing to utilize the expertise of ADEC for providing webmaster support for responses/exercises.
- Recommend that the initial site posting only provide navigation options to populated pages. As additional information becomes available more pages links should be added (e.g. in this exercise the situation report and fact sheets should not have been activated since no data was available for posting). By providing links to pages with no information the impression might be that the website is not being maintained or that the unified command is failing to effectively respond.
- Recommend that SEAPRO's logo be included on future Southeast Alaska exercise websites to ensure they receive due credit for their extensive participation in planning and executing these events.

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OBSERVATION:

Guidelines should be developed to assist the environmental unit in developing a product-sampling plan for a response.

DISCUSSION:

The importance of an effective sampling plan is to fingerprint the oil and establish background environmental levels prior to anticipated impacts from the spill. The plan would maintain statistical significance of the samples and included Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) measures.

Findings from the samples are important for accurate Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) determinations.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

The environmental unit identified the need for a sampling plan for the scenario. However given personnel limits and time constraints, a plan was not developed during the exercise.

It was noted that guidelines are not currently available in the Southeast Subarea Contingency Plan. They would have been helpful in developing a specific plan for the scenario.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Recommended that the Southeast Subarea Committee (for the SEAK Subarea Contingency Plan) develop guidelines to address the issues discussed above. SEAPRO should be included in the development of the guidelines. The Alaska Unified Plan should also be updated as appropriate. Potential sources for templates to develop a generic plan include:

- ADEC Sampling Plan for Oil Spill Cleanup Operations (May 2003 draft)
- Fate and Effects: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (ADEC water quality)
- ADEC QAPP (UST Program)
- TetraTech (Puget Sound) - sampling protocols
- US Coast Guard Marine Safety Laboratory Sample Handling and Transmittal Guide Sixth Edition (June 2002)

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OBSERVATION:

Delta Western recognized the need to develop a tailored cost documentation spreadsheet for spill response.

DISCUSSION:

A spreadsheet was seen as the best tool for tracking costs and providing projections for future expenditures. Periodic updates to the incident commanders and section chiefs are greatly facilitated through the use of a spreadsheet or database.

Currently SEAPRO does not utilize a spreadsheet for cost documentation.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

Prior to the exercise the CG Pacific Strike Team (PST) provided participants in the finance section with cost documentation training.

During the exercise the CG and ADEC utilized separate spreadsheets to capture cost documentation for the response. As a result, the finance section chief for Delta Western was provided the opportunity to review both spreadsheets in use.

Following the exercise it was noted that:

- The CG spreadsheet was very detailed and tailored for CG use.
- The ADEC spreadsheet was more user friendly, but lacked some features required by Delta Western.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that SEAPRO work with Delta Western to develop a cost documentation spreadsheet, which is tailored to their needs.
- Recommend that the new SEAPRO spreadsheet be made available for other member company use.

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OBSERVATION:

The MSO Juneau training room is not currently equipped for setting up an effective situation unit and/or communications unit. In addition, procedures for unit operations do not exist.

DISCUSSION:

Currently the training room does not have installed radio communications equipment. Phone line connections are present, however phone and fax machines would have to be taken from existing MSO office spaces.

No equipment list, guidelines, or procedures exists for setting up and operating the MSO training room as a situation/communications unit.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

A combined situation and communications unit was established at the MSO Juneau training room during the field deployment portion of exercise.

Communications Unit.

Prior to field operations, responders at the Delta Western field command post (FCP) were not briefed on anticipated reporting requirements to the UC's situation unit (e.g. schedule for periodic updates, what information would be required, etc.). However, at the start of the deployment an MSO representative was assigned to the FCP to facilitate information requests.

Though envisioned, CG radio communications were not established between the FCP and the training room due to a planning/coordination glitch. CG communications with the FCP were established through cell phones and MSO fax lines (though not located in the training room).

ADEC did provide radio equipment in the training room which monitored the on-scene communications and was capable of communicating with the field on standard marine frequencies.

Situation Unit.

Initially situation reports from the FCP were not detailed or consistently relayed. As the exercise progressed the situation unit worked to clarify their information needs and established a timeline for periodic updates from the FCP.

The situation unit also utilized SEAPRO's Automated Secure Vessel Tracking System (ASVTS) for visual display of position data for their skimming vessel (i.e. Neka Bay). Position data was available through an internet based charting program and onboard transponder which provided real-time data. Users at multiple locations simultaneously could access the information. In the future additional ASVTS transponders may be economically feasible to locate skiff and boom anchor locations.

The situation unit experimented with several methods for graphically depicting the information they received with regard to the on-water deployments. The group eventually settled on the idea of projecting the digital chart from the ASVTS website onto a wall-mounted dry-erase board so that the positions of the other vessels, spill trajectories, and equipment could be easily drawn in.

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Equipment List.

The participants also drafted the following list of equipment requirements to support future use of the training room as a situation unit:

- Digital phones
- Phone patches
- Long DSL cable
- Dedicated fax line incoming/outgoing
- Laptops
- Printer (capable for all users to use)
- Phone lines labeled with phone numbers
- ESI Maps
- Charts for all tables with mylar
- Laminated incident status "form" posters
- Plans
- Designated basic office supplies.

MSO Juneau has electronic charts available and will be able to project onto a dry erase board. The training room currently has 5 wall-mounted dry-erase boards permanently installed and one portable unit.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that MSO Juneau, CGD17 (ppt), and ADEC test/evaluate communications options for the training room during the exercises scheduled for the summer of 2003 (i.e. Black Hole and Away Team Exercises).
- Recommend MSO Juneau draft an instruction that addresses activation procedures for utilizing the training room as a situation unit, communications unit, or small command post. The instruction should describe how to set the room up, list location of required supplies, include directions for the phone system, discuss the expected type/flow of information to/from the unit, etc..
- Recommend that ICS position job aids be reviewed to ensure that section/unit "go-kits" have the recommended supplies and equipment. CG job aids are available online at: <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfcc/nsfweb/index.html>
- Recommend that MSO Juneau work with the City and Borough of Juneau (CBJ) to determine if another location is available for establishing a command post.

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OBSERVATION:

Treating the observer vessel program as an integral part of the field deployment helped to facilitate its smooth and safe execution.

DISCUSSION:

N/a.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

Several briefings were conducted in preparation for the equipment deployment; unified command 204 overview, field response team tactics meeting, and a safety briefing. During each briefing the observer vessels were effectively treated as a separate group within the field response team branch. The communications plan included the provisions that for normal operation the observer vessels would have their own frequency, they would maintain communication with the field command post (FCP), and that they would not communicate with the skimming and booming group vessels unless an emergency occurred.

As a result the operations section and field response team had a good understanding of where the observer vessels would be and how to communicate with them.

An example of the effectiveness of this integration was the last minute addition of a photo-op to the deployment plan. At the tactics meeting it was agreed that one of the observer vessels could briefly communicate with the skimming group to position vessels for the photo-op. The photo-op was executed without any difficulties.

Observer vessel communications were exercised by maintaining periodic reporting to the FCP.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that details about special operations (e.g. observer vessels, photo ops, man overboard drills, etc.) be included during tactics meetings / safety briefings with the field response team.
- Recommend that all on-water activities check in/out with the FCP.
- Recommend that the communication plans include separate frequencies and clear procedures so that special operations do not impede field response team communications.

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OBSERVATION:

Floatplane safety issues should have been more formally addressed for the equipment deployment.

DISCUSSION:

During the tourist season from May-September, the Juneau harbor has a high level of floatplane activity.

Departing planes regularly takeoff in the vicinity of the anticipated staging boat ramps and boom deployment sites.

The tactics and safety briefings should have included information on traffic patterns of floatplanes and recommendations for restricted areas. In addition the floatplane operators should have attended the meeting.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

The MSO coordinated a BNTM, notified the FAA, and notified floatplane operators prior to the deployment.

On the day of the equipment deployment, a tactics/safety briefing was conducted for all on-water responders and observers. Overall the brief was comprehensive and very informative, however floatplane issues were not addressed.

During the morning deployment one of the observer vessels was cautioned by a floatplane as it prepared to takeoff. In addition several floatplanes appeared to be flying unusually close to the boom group to get a better look at what they were doing.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- For future deployments, recommend that the floatplane companies be invited to attend the safety brief to address any new concerns or updates in information that will reduce any conflicts in waterway management, the day of the deployment.
- In addition, recommend inviting potential waterway users/stakeholders to the tactics/safety briefing to ensure they are aware of last minute changes to the plan and are given one more opportunity to raise safety concerns.

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OBSERVATION:

The Lawson Creek boom deployment provided an excellent opportunity for Delta Western and SEAPRO to coordinate a challenging booming tactic while also exercising existing support agreements they maintain with other tank farm operators in the Juneau Harbor area.

DISCUSSION:

Delta Western, Taku Oil, and Petro Marine Services jointly deployed 1,500 feet of boom in two separate locations during the equipment deployment portion of the exercise on 15-May.

The first location featured a challenging deflection tactic, known as cascading, in the location of Lawson Creek. Lawson Creek is identified as a sensitive area. At the mouth of the creek is a tidal flat, which stretched at least 500 feet from shore at low tide. Conversely, at high tide the water depths are only 3-4 feet deep.

The second location was by the Taku Oil boat ramp and involved a diversion tactic to establishing a shore side collection point for skimming during an ebb tide.

While the booming operations were being conducted, SEAPRO's "Neka Bay" skimming vessel acted as the command/control vessel and deployed its onboard skimming systems. SeaCoast Towing's Tug "Tiger" and tank barge "Sea-76" also deployed the barge's onboard boom around the two vessels in the morning. In addition 3 CG Auxiliary vessels provided observer support throughout the day.



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HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

The Lawson Creek deployment was conducted between 10am-12pm during the latter part of a flood tide. Operations were concluded just before slack conditions. A current of 1-2 knots existed throughout the deployment while the tidal flat was being increasingly covered by water. As a result the boom had to be constantly adjusted and the anchors were difficult to set.

The booming group chose to use three skiffs, three 500-foot lengths of boom, and six 40 lb anchor systems to attempt the tactic.

The boat crews successfully worked together to attempt the tactic while addressing difficult conditions at the site.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Overall the event provided an excellent opportunity to test communications between the group supervisor and skiffs. Several observations were captured for future deployments in the area:

Timing of the deployment. Trying to *effectively* deploy cascading boom on a large, shallow, tidal flat is nearly impossible during a *flood tide*. However, attempting the tactic at slack following a flood tide would have been effective. In addition, for this tactic to be successful the trajectory of a spill would have to allow time for the boom to be in place well ahead of the area being impacted.

Length of boom sections. The 500-foot lengths of boom were too long, which created management problems for the skiffs and the anchoring systems tended to drag. Field deployment personnel agreed that 200 – 300 foot lengths of boom would have been more appropriate. Additional boom lengths could be added to the initial placements of boom if needed.

- This observation validates SEAPRO tactics manual, Section 2 Deflection Booming Strategies.
- The decision to use 500-foot lengths of boom was driven more by the PREP requirements (i.e. for internal semiannual equipment deployment credit) than by the needs of the tactic.

Anchor Systems:

- While adjusting the scope of the anchor lines one of the skiff operators replaced the anchor shackles with carabiners. They noted that this made connecting the anchors to boom and floats much easier.

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- One of the skiffs had a depth sounder, which proved very valuable for determining the correct scope of line for deploying the anchors.

Coordination Issues:

- Using two skiffs, instead of one, was recommended when setting the anchors for this tactic.
- Due to the shallow depths in this area, shoreside support would have made this tactic easier to accomplish.
- Skiff operators needed the tide and current information to anticipate changing environmental conditions that affected the effectiveness of the tactic.
- The boat crews utilized different hardhat colors (i.e. Delta Western wore yellow, Petro Marine wore green, and Taku Oil wore white) to assist in their visual identification. This facilitated the command vessel's direction of resources since the workboats were all very similar in color and size.
- Exercising all of the SEAPRO facility members in the Juneau harbor area during the deployment was seen as a great opportunity to learn from each other and strengthen team relationships.



Southeast Alaska Gov't-Led Area Exercise 2003 Lessons Learned Attachments

OBSERVATION:

On the first day of an actual response it is unlikely that a unified command post (UCP) could be effectively established at Centennial Hall in Juneau.

DISCUSSION:


The current edition of the Southeast Alaska Subarea Contingency Plan (SCP) identifies Centennial Hall as a viable option for setting up a command post in the event of a large spill in the Juneau area. During the planning of this exercise the design team questioned the validity of this for the following reasons:

- a. The responsible party's facility, MSO training room, and ADEC command post (i.e. Bat Cave) would be the initial mobilization sites for the responding organizations. The decision to jointly move to an alternate location would be a difficult call to make since the responders would be established at their initial mobilization sites.
- b. Centennial Hall would likely be booked for another event. Several additional hours would be required to negotiate the cancellation of the other event and begin setup procedures for the command post.
- c. Currently Centennial Hall only has eight external telephone lines. While more lines can be brought in, this would be expensive and time consuming. (Note that in the case of this exercise the phone system that the participants used was an internal system only).
- d. No formal plan exists for setting up a UCP at Centennial Hall. The plan should address the expected physical needs of the unified command (i.e. tables, chairs, screens, projectors, space usage, traffic flow, etc.).
- e. Rental of a large capacity photocopying machine is only available in Juneau through Tongass Business Center Inc.. Contracting for a machine is not included in the Centennial Hall rental agreement and availability of a machine is limited.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

Centennial Hall was selected as the site for the command post exercise in order to facilitate control of the exercise and to accommodate larger numbers of participants. The facility worked well for this purpose.

Southeast Alaska Gov't-Led Area Exercise 2003
Lessons Learned Attachments



The design team developed a setup plan for the playing spaces and tailored it to meet anticipated needs for the players/controllers for the exercise. The plan appeared to be adequate for the drill, with the exception that a dedicated press briefing room needed to be added. During an actual response the control room would have been available for press briefings.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend that MSO Juneau investigate other facility options for establishing a large command post in Juneau. Viability of each option should be documented (i.e. number of phone lines, security, availability, setup time, space requirements, etc.) and specific setup plans need to be developed to meet anticipated needs.
- Recommend that the Southeast Alaska Subarea Contingency Plan be updated to reflect the issues above. In addition, potential command post locations listed in the plan for other communities should be re-evaluated.

Southeast Alaska Gov't-Led Area Exercise 2003

Lessons Learned Attachments

OBSERVATION:

The CG lessons learned database (CG SAILS), which was the specified method for developing the after action report for this exercise, is too constrained by formatting and does not take advantage of current computer technologies.

DISCUSSION:

The joint design team unanimously agreed that the summary report and lessons learned formats are very confusing and redundant.

For the summary report, the section headers and descriptions do not appear to be designed for an exercise (e.g. Operational data, Limitations and Casualties, etc.).

For the lessons learned reports, the "Observation", "Discussion", "Lessons Learned", and "Recommendation" sections are repetitive. This has several negative results:

- The reports often become too wordy, requiring more time to draft and review.
- Research into existing reports posted to CG SAILS revealed that many drafters simply reworded the same information to meet the requirement of putting text in each section.
- Some lessons learned, which do not require large explanations, are not included in the report because they appear to lack substance.

Due to the database format, each lessons learned requires its own stand-alone report. The user therefore has to open several reports in the database in order to scan and/or print the entire report for the event.

Pictures, charts, and diagrams cannot be posted to the database. Often these provide greater understanding of the issue being addressed.

HOW EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE:

The joint exercise design team struggled to understand the formatting and was frustrated by the lack of flexibility in developing the report.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- Recommend allowing design teams to develop their own reporting formats, which are familiar and useful to the exercise participants. Provide content guidance to ensure the reports cover government requirements (e.g. PREP requirements).
- Recommend utilizing Adobe software to create pdf postings of reports, which are text searchable via existing Internet technologies. Pdf files can be made from many programs (e.g. MS Word, WS, Excel, MS PowerPoint, etc.), graphics are not an issue, and adobe-readers are available for free download. Develop a website to post the reports and put a pdf search engine on the site.