


U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
**United States
Coast Guard**



**ConocoPhillips**

**Alyeska pipeline**
SERVICE COMPANY



After-Action Report

Prince William Sound Area Exercise 2004



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Introduction

Purpose and Scope

This report contains a comprehensive list of observations, lessons learned, best practices, and recommended follow up actions noted during the design and execution of the 2004 Prince William Sound Area Exercise.

The purpose of this report is to document the effectiveness of the spill response community within the Prince William Sound area as observed during this exercise. It is assumed that the lessons learned and recommended follow up actions will be analyzed and acted upon by the organizations that are responsible for the specific processes noted herein. As with any exercise, it is also assumed that the information contained in this report will be used to update applicable contingency plans wherever necessary.

Report Organization

This report is organized into three parts:

Part A: Executive Summary

Part B: PREP Core Component Observations/Lessons Learned

Part C: Exercise Design Observations/Lessons Learned

Due to the amount of information in this report, it is formatted to allow the reader to easily find the section(s) that they are interested in while bypassing other sections.

The executive summary is designed as a stand-alone report or as a guide to those topics that the reader would like additional, detailed information on.

Detailed information on the exercise scenario, objectives, design, etc can be found on the exercise's website at:
<http://www.akrrt.org/pwsareaex04>



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Executive Summary

Introduction

The 2004 Prince William Sound Area Exercise (AreaEx) was conducted in Valdez, AK on August 4th & 5th, 2004 in accordance with the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP). This exercise successfully met the primary objective of any AreaEx by exercising the entire response community.

This summary addresses the major lessons learned and recommended follow up actions. The balance of the lessons learned are covered in Parts B & C of this report.

Primary Participants

U.S. Coast Guard
ConocoPhillips
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (APSC)
Ship Escort/Response Vessel System (SERVS)
PWS Regional Citizens Advisory Council (RCAC)

Exercise Synopsis

This exercise was conducted as a two day command post exercise with a simultaneous field deployment on Day One.

The equipment deployment represented a pre-determined sample of Tier 1 response equipment, and the successful deployment of the geographic response strategy (GRS) for Jack Bay.

APSC led the incident management team (IMT) on Day One, with ConocoPhillips personnel shadowing and/or assisting in most sections/units. This IMT consisted of representatives from the entire PWS response community.

The official IMT transition from APSC to ConocoPhillips occurred during the shift change on Day Two (approximately 24 hours into the incident). The exercise concluded upon the approval of the 3rd operational period's incident action plan.

Major Lessons & Recommendations

IMT Transition: A seamless IMT transition from APSC to the responsible party (RP) following a spill is critical. The more closely that APSC/SERVS and the individual shippers' response processes and procedures are aligned, and the better trained the RP personnel are on PWS-specific response issues, the easier this transition will be.

Executive Summary (Cont'd)

Major Lessons & Recommendations (Cont'd)

Recommendations: 1) Align as many PWS response community processes/procedures as possible (e.g. ICS guides and forms, incident management software, etc).
2) All response organizations should ensure that future training programs are provided "jointly," allowing for maximum response community involvement.
3) Training should be provided to all shippers' IMTs on PWS-specific issues, response capabilities, and pre-planned strategies/tactics. This training should occur annually in order to keep personnel current.

ICS Process: On Day One, the APSC/SERVS-led planning process was erratic and not in keeping with standard ICS protocol. Additionally, both IMTs demonstrated a tendency to overlook current situation information when planning for future operational periods.

Recommendations: 1) APSC/SERVS should evaluate their existing training program and enhance its focus on the ICS-process (e.g., meeting management, planning process, etc). 2) Future training should emphasize that the planning process, when performed correctly, does not distract the IMT from monitoring current operations and analyzing them for their impacts to the next operational period.

F/V Training: Effective tactical deployment of SERVS response equipment relies heavily on the timely arrival of sufficient fishing vessels, with properly trained crews. During this exercise, one Tier 1 (core fleet) fishing vessel crew was not adequately trained on the equipment assigned to their vessel. If an untrained crew was contracted for an exercise that had been planned for several months, it raises the question as to how many F/Vs would require training if called up with no prior notice (i.e., as in an actual incident). Note: This crew was currently trained on hazardous waste operations (HAZWOPER).

Recommendation: The F/V program should be fully evaluated and any additional training shortfalls should be identified. This program must ensure that all Tier 1 F/Vs have fully trained crews at all times.

Conclusion

All PWS response organizations should jointly analyze the lessons learned provided in this report, commit the resources

Executive Summary (Cont'd)

**Conclusion
(Cont'd)**

necessary to develop solutions, and ensure that these solutions are incorporated into future responses, exercises, and plans. A joint workgroup should be formed to ensure that the lessons learned during this exercise are addressed before the next annual shipper exercise in PWS.
