

ARRT Meeting Minutes and Semi-Annual Report

06-Dec-01

The semi-annual meeting of the Alaska Regional Response Team (ARRT) occurred at the State's Talking Library in Anchorage, Alaska on 06 December 2001 (08:15-16:45).

1. Welcome/Introductions/Safety Brief (USCG & EPA Co-Chairs)

Co-Chairs Carl Lautenberger (EPA) and CAPT Jack Davin (CGD17) welcomed ARRT members and participants to the meeting. CAPT Davin reviewed his background prior to arrival in Alaska. ARRT members and meeting attendees introduced themselves.

Mr. Lautenberger noted it has been six months since the last meeting of the ARRT, during which time many events had occurred. He reviewed the agenda for the meeting, noting that suggested time allocations were assigned for each speaker/presentation.

2. OSC Reports.

a. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC). (by Brad Hahn, ADEC)

Response Update. The department is undergoing a revamp of its spill database and hopes to place the database on the web by July 2002. The July-September quarterly report was handed out to attendees. The first half of the year was normal in terms of historic numbers of spills. The second half of the year was much lower, with the third quarter being 30% lower. There were 1,726 report spills thus far in 2001.

➤ The TAPS 400 Bullet Hole spill was the largest during this period. A joint "lessons learned" report is being prepared which should be available in February. The details of this event will be covered under the EPA's OSC presentation (*on page 6*).

➤ There were two marina spills in Juneau that were cooperatively addressed by EPA and ADEC. There were also two crude oil releases on the North Slope, both of which had good responses. There were significant marine vessel spills, including the *F/V Vanguard* (ice collision) and the *F/V Windy Bay* (collision with a charted rock) in Prince William Sound (PWS). Both responses were conducted cooperatively between ADEC and the USCG. The response to the *Windy Bay* also proved the value of the *Current Buster* system, a new and innovative boom design for on-water skimming systems. There were several mystery spills in Cook Inlet, one of which was the abandoned line from the Anna Platform. BP has taken the lead on this effort. There is a need to address potential liabilities that exist with older abandoned lines. There was a chemical spill at U pad, on the North Slope, due to a truck rollover. This spill highlighted the fact that responses to hazardous materials have not been considered to the extent of oil spills. As a result, some delays were encountered in the response to this accident.

➤ Earlier in the summer some natural seeps raised attention. These occurred at the Point Simpson well site and on the Colville River near Umiat. There are a number of natural seeps on the North Slope and ADEC is attempting to collect data on them as they are found. Unfortunately, federal dollars cannot be used to respond

to a natural seep. The State does not have the same restrictions, but ADEC will be cautious in responding to natural seeps.

Drills. Six oil spill drills were conducted, including the first major drill by the Alaska Railroad Corporation (ARRC). These drills are bringing to light health and safety issues related to spill response strategies. There was also a Whittier HAZMAT drill involving both Anchorage and Whittier HAZMAT teams.

Prevention & Response Planning.

➤ The *Tundra Treatment Manual*, which was mentioned at the last meeting, is still under going review and should be available in the next few months. Please look for it on the ADEC website

(<http://www.state.ak.us/dec/home.htm>).

➤ A task force was formed to aggressively review non-tank vessel regulations, with particular emphasis on requirements for contingency planning. These will be put out for public review in January and should be completed in July. The regulations will allow either a full contingency plan or a streamlined contingency plan. The plan will focus the response requirements back to the non-tank contractor, rather than on the plan holder. There are significant changes related to contracting that might affect non-tank companies. One of the most significant aspects of the plan is the establishment of a Response Plan Facilitator. These regulations will potentially affect 400 to 1,100 vessels. The first plans will be required in January 2003.

➤ The Contaminated Sites Remediation Program is also opening up regulations for review. A public meeting will be held December 11, 2001 at the Z.J. Loussac Library in Anchorage.

➤ Geographic Response Strategy (GRS) work groups are currently active in PWS, Cook Inlet, and Southeast Alaska. ADEC was provided a capital budget last year to fund these efforts. A contract was recently released in Southeast to identify a prioritized list of sensitive areas for GRS development. 60 sites will be selected and developed over the next few years.

➤ A meeting was held to review comments on the initial update to the draft *Alaska Incident Management System (AIMS) Guide*. ADEC will be revising the document to remove confusing items. Consideration is also being given to adopting the planning cycle out of the *USCG Incident Management Handbook*. Comments are due back and the updated draft will be available on February 28, 2002. There will be a meeting on April 15, 2002 with commenters to review the final version. The goal is to publish the guide during the summer of 2002. Though the ARRT will not be asked to adopt the guide, it is a tool that will be available for responders as they see fit.

b. COTP Southeast AK.

(by CDR Steve Ohnstad, OSC-MSO Juneau)

Response Update. Southeast Alaska experienced no significant spills in the last six months.

➤ Of interest was a 400-gallon diesel spill in Auke Bay that resulted from a rupture in a flexible connection in a pipeline at a marina that does refueling of recreational vehicles. The response was done cooperatively with ADEC. Also of interest was a 500-gallon spill at the next marina, involving another flexible connection.

➤ There have also been some heating oil spills; in response, a pamphlet has been developed and distributed to heating oil distributors.

Prevention & Response Planning.

➤ Port security planning has been a major focus since September 11th. The USCG is working closely with the tourist industry and local port/harbor authorities to be ready for the 2002 summer season, which starts in May.

➤ New federal regulations relating to wastewater discharge by cruise ships have recently been released. Three violations related to wastewater discharge were prosecuted in the last several months. All three of the discharge violations were self-reported by the ships. There were many reports by private individuals regarding suspected discharge by cruise ships, none of which proved true.

Drills & Exercises.

➤ A CG Away Team exercise focusing on communications was conducted with Princess Cruiselines this summer. The event took place in Disenchantment Bay (Yakutat - Hubbard Glacier) which is an area of traditionally difficult communications. This area is being visited more frequently by cruise ships each year. As a result, a joint exercise was conducted with M/V Regal Princess that successfully used a temporary repeater to establish communications back to the USCG in Juneau. The USFS has also installed a repeater site that covers part of Disenchantment Bay.

➤ Preparations are being initiated for a NPREP Government-Led Area Exercise which will take place during the spring of 2003. Lead Industry participation will be solicited for this coming spring.

c. COTP Prince William Sound.

(by CDR Peyton Coleman)

Response Update. The *F/V Windy Bay* spill occurred on August 4, 2001. 35,000 gallons of diesel were released when the ship collided with a charted rock and sunk in extraordinarily deep water. The ship still leaks, albeit by minimal amounts. The response was unusually quick, due to the proximity of the *F/V Vanguard* spill that had occurred the day prior. A Unified Command (UC) was established and all cooperating agencies worked together to effectively address the spill. Skimming activities continued through the evening, recovering a significant amount of diesel. The percentage of oil removed from the water was very high. The area is rich in wildlife and there were concerns related to that, as well as to typical logistics issues.

Of note the first time deployment of the "Current Buster" boom system occurred during this spill. The system worked very well.

CDR Coleman stated the *F/V Windy Bay* spill was also a test of the SERVVS trained fishing vessel fleet, which performed also well

Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT) efforts associated with the spill involved six miles of shoreline in nine different locations. Both USCG and ADEC helped to identify spill areas through this effort. USFWS was the lead agency for wildlife concerns. A total of 7 birds died and 2 were captured, treated and released. Over 60 otters were monitored for several days for oil behavior, but no impact was detected. Several miles of boom were put in place to protect sensitive areas like oyster pens and hatcheries, wetlands, and sandy beaches. The SCAT teams recommended passive rather than active clean up.

There were 13,245 gallons of liquid and 786 bags of solid waste to dispose of following the event, presenting a significant waste management challenge.

The UC established stakeholder communications early, but learned from this experience to ensure direct contact with village leaders (i.e. Eyak village in Cordova).

This incident involved 24 response and support vessels, over 150 response personnel, characterization of 6 miles of shoreline, deployment of 10,550 feet of boom for containment and protection, remote logistics, and a cost of the response was \$5.2 million.

Mr. Hahn (ADEC) explained the most significant characteristic of the *Current Buster* is that effective skimming can occur at towing speeds of 4-5 knots, rather than the 1-2 knots of most other systems. In addition it minimizes water collection by the skimmer, which allows for maximum storage use and little requirement for decanting. The design also eases the steering requirements for skimming vessels since it keeps the vessel next to the boom through a sucking effect created by the boom. The *Current Buster* was originally designed for rivers with fast currents; an *Ocean Buster* system is being designed for open-water applications.

Ms. Holzinger (BIA) voiced appreciation for the efforts to work with the Eyak Corporation after the UC was made aware of the need for greater communications. She asked for additional information on the SERVVS trained fishing vessel fleet that assisted in the spill response. CDR Coleman suggested Ms. Holzinger contact Dave Lawrence at Alyeska for information.

d. COTP Western Alaska.
(by CAPT Bill Hutmacher)

Response Update. Prior to and after September 11th there has been continue good coordination with ADEC in terms of identifying the lead agency for several minor spills which occurred. No major spills have occurred since the last meeting.

➤ There have been several mystery spills in the Dutch Harbor area over the past few months, ranging from 200 to 50,000 gallons in size, which the OSLTF has been used to pay for response efforts. Work is being done with the local government of Unalaska to determine who is responsible for these spills.

➤ Hog Island near Dutch Harbor is being reviewed as potentially cleanup site due to the presence of several abandoned oil drums, which appear to be leaking. It is a formerly used defense site from WWII. The

responsible party for this site is still being investigated. To complicate the matter the site is located next to the oldest archeological site in Alaska.

- *M/V Spanky Pain*, a 100+ year old tug, which operates out of Kodiak, lost a barge tow recently while in heavy weather. The barge ran aground and dumped its cargo of vehicles on a remote section of Kodiak Island. The vessels operating license is being reviewed.
- At the Port of Anchorage, the *F/V Leo* spilled diesel in the Ship Creek area, a major recreational fishing location for the community. Fortunately the spill impact was negligible and public interest was minimal.

Prevention & Response Planning. MSO Anchorage has established a Memorandums of Understanding with the Municipality of Anchorage and the Alaska Division of Emergency Services (ADES) or use of their respective emergency operation centers as command posts for the spill response. Anchorage recently opened a new and impressive emergency operations center.

e. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

(by Carl Lautenberger & Matt Carr, EPA)

Response Update. EPA conducted all spill responses jointly with ADEC. Responses over the last six months included: Moody's Marina at Aleknagik, NPR-A Cape Simpson natural seep, Umiat/Colville River natural seep, BP Drill Site #1, Crystal Creek Lodge, TAPS Mile Post 400, Fisher Fuels at Cooper Landing, and the U Pad acid spill.

- **Moody's Marina.** The spill, which occurred in late May, was a 5000-gallon gasoline spill to an earthen berm 15 miles north of Dillingham in the village of Aleknagik. Little impact occurred to the nearby Aleknagik Lake.
- **NPR-A Cape Simpson Natural Seep.** The seep occurred in the area of a series of test wells drilled 50 years ago by the federal government. This area was explored because of knowledge of natural seeps in the area; they are naturally occurring and have existed for thousands of years.
- **Umiat/Colville River Natural Seep.** The seep, which occurred in July, caused concern because Umiat is a formerly utilized defense site which the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) is doing an extensive clean up. This is also an area where test wells were drilled over 50 years ago. The Colville River is eroding and has migrated near two wells that ACE will be abandoning in the near future. There was concern whether something had happened to the integrity of these wells. It was discovered that these wells had been visited shortly before this spill and they were intact. Upon reaching the site, there were no obvious signs of an oil spill and it was determined the occurrence was a natural seep.
- **BP's Drill Site #1.** A rupture in the flowline occurred over the reserve pit. As a result oil sprayed on to the water in the reserve pit and the gravel sides. The oily water was collected with a vac truck. The oiled gravel was excavated. The release occurred with an unknown amount of gas under pressure and wind carried some of the oil onto the tundra. BPX estimated that 240,000 square feet (5.5 acres) of tundra were misted. Standing water in the tundra showing some sheening, which was removed with sorbent material. The oil on the tundra was removed with a weed burner through burning the grass. Approximately 2 acres of tundra were burned to

remove the oil. The reserve pit will need to be completely dewatered and a scaffolding built before the ruptured area of the pipeline can be examined.

➤ **Crystal Creek Lodge.** The spill occurred at a sport-fishing lodge on Lake Nunavaugaluk, near Dillingham when 1,400 gallons of diesel overflowed a tank in late August. This spill went directly to the lake and there was beach staining. Trenching was employed, as well as use of absorbent materials and a containment boom. There was a high recovery rate of about 50%.

➤ **TAPS MP 400.** The spill resulted from a bullet puncturing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline near Livengood, 45 miles north of Fairbanks. This was the type of spill the drill planners love to propose; every time you think you've established the facts, they change. Initially, even the location of the spill was uncertain. One of the first actions was to bring in the Alaska State Troopers (AST), who was attempting to apprehend the individual who perpetrated the shooting. Conflicting reports were received about the individual and his location. Once the facts were sorted out by AST, a decision was made that the response team could safely release their resources to the scene. Fortunately the individual turned out not to be a terrorist, but there were concerns in that regard prior to his apprehension.

The pipeline was shut down immediately, but because of the pressure in the line, a great deal of oil was released through the bullet puncture. Less than 500 feet away from the pipeline Shorty Creek runs, which drains to the Tolavana River, which in turn flows into Minto Flats (an important for subsistence and recreation use area). Securing a remote gate valve was a major strategy in controlling the spill. The valve shut down the portion of the pipeline that was damaged. Various gate and check valves were then opened to pump oil back to Pump Station 5 in an effort to decrease pressure. Concurrently response efforts were focused on determining the leading edge of the oil in the forest and initiating trenching techniques to stop the down slope spread of the spill. The spill emergency response time lasted 36 hours, due to the complexity of issues involved. Alyeska mobilized a tremendous amount of equipment in a very short period of time to respond to this spill. Firefighting crews from Minto, Rampart, and Stephens Village were brought in, in addition to equipment from SERVVS and equipment from Alyeska. Trenches were dug under the forest mat to drain oil into containment pits. The oil was recovered, filtered, reprocessed, and put back into the pipeline. Trees that were heavily oiled were removed. 6,700 to 6,800 barrels of oil (175,000 gallons of free liquids) were recovered.

The remaining cleanup portions of the response are outlined in a remediation plan Alyeska has submitted to EPA, ADEC and DNR (the land owner) to hopefully clean out the site by the end of the year. Contaminated vegetation and soil will need to be removed. The area will be backfilled, re-graded, and recovery and re-invasion of natural species will be facilitated in the area. A joint after action report will be prepared to assess lessons learned from the response, which should be available by late February.

*Following the presentation **Mr. Hahn (ADEC)** recognized **Mr. Lautenberger** and the work he did on the TAPS MP-400 oil spill. He presented a certificate of appreciation to **Mr. Lautenberger**, who he characterized as a key resource, a depth of knowledge, and a good hand.*

➤ **Fisher Fuels Tank Truck Rollover.** The accident occurred along the Sterling Highway near Cooper Landing on 29-Oct-01. The tank was carrying gasoline and diesel. Fortunately, not much product went into the Kenai River. 5,000 gallons of gasoline and diesel spilled. Fisher Fuels hired R&K Industrial out of Kenai, which brought vacuum trucks in to address the spill. This spill site is near an historical site, but it site was not

impacted.

➤ **U Pad Acid Spill.** The spill resulted from a truck rollover near Deadhorse on 30-Oct-01. BP estimates that approximately 1,764 gallons of a xylene/freshwater/hydrochloric acid mixture were spilled to the tundra (consisting of 20% xylene, 68% fresh water and 12% hydrochloric acid). The area of tundra impacted by contamination has been estimated at 37,910 square feet (0.870 acres). BP ended recovery using the steam and vacuum technique. Aerial photographs indicated that the spill impacted a low-lying area and responders encountered a large amount of ice in the spill area. A 966 loader and a bobcat, both with trimmer attachments, removed the gross contamination on the surface of the ice, and did not impact the tundra below. A trimmer is a rotating steel-toothed cutting device used to shave layers of ice. A total of 4,050 sq. feet of ice was trimmed and cleaned. An additional 1,110 sq. feet was cleaned at the far east side of the spill site with a supersucker. A total of 1,477 cubic yards of snow were removed from the site, and transported to T Pad where snow melting operations produced 103,320 gallons (2,460 bbls) of fluids. The recovered fluids are classified as non-hazardous waste and were re-injected at Pad 3, which is a permitted disposal facility for non-hazardous waste.

Drills & Exercises.

The following preparedness exercises were conducted: Whittier HAZMAT, TAPS Lowe River (a NPREP Industry-Led Area Exercise), North Slope Mutual Aid Drill, fast water booming on the Klutina River, and the Alaska Rail Road Corporation (ARRC) tabletop exercise. The ARRC tabletop was a successful drill that showed a marked improvement on the part of the railroad over the spill that occurred two years ago. There was a brief review of each exercise in terms of equipment used, participants involved, methods used, and offshore and onshore components.

Prevention & Response Planning. Courses that were conducted include an Inland Oil Spill Course, a Wetlands Mass Destruction Course, and a HazCat Course. There will be three future trainings (Emergency Response, HAZMAT Incident Operations, and HAZMAT Sampling). Fifty-five inspections were done statewide resulting in five enforcement cases.

3. Working Group Reports.

a. Cultural Resources Working Group (CRWG).

(by Pamela Bergmann, DOI)

- Work has continued with the USCG, EPA, DOI, Alaska Inter-Tribal Council representatives, and State and Federal archaeologists on preparation of the final version of the *Alaska Implementation Guidelines for Federal On-Scene Coordinators for the Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties during Emergency Response under the National Contingency Plan*. We have one more round of review for two revisions that resulted from a meeting yesterday, after which we anticipate that the document will be ready to be signed.
- DOI and the USFWS Chief Archaeologist began working with USCG representatives on language that can be used to identify contract archaeologists who could serve as an Historic Properties Specialist for FOSCs.
- DOI and the Alaska Office of History and Archaeology (AOHA) continued to provide technical assistance to

FOSCs and their historic properties specialists following activation for a number of spills since the last ARRT meeting, including the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Bullet Hole spill.

- DOI, USFS,, and AOHA representatives, in cooperation with Chevron Corporation representatives and Chumis Cultural Resources Services, designed and presented a half-day training session on historic properties during a June 2001 Chevron exercise in Princes William Sound.
- Federal and State archaeologists have continued providing historic properties input into the identification, development, and field-testing of Geographic Response Strategies (GRSs) in various areas in the State.

b. Wildlife Protection Working Group (WPWG).

(by Pamela Bergmann, DOI)

The WPWG began making revisions to selected sections of the *Wildlife Protection Guidelines for Alaska*. That activity has been on hold since 9/11. Our goal is to pick up where we left off in the first quarter of Calendar Year 2002.

Pribilof Islands Wildlife Protection Guidelines. Revisions of the Pribilof guidelines were completed in May 2001. The revision focused on updates to contact and training information and the procedures for future updated to the guidelines. The updated guidelines were provided to the USCG, EPA, and ADEC for inclusion in the *Aleutian Subarea Contingency Plan*. The revised guidelines (in a “pdf” format) were also provided to the USCG for inclusion on the ARRT website, which has been accomplished.

CANUSDIX WRWG.

- Representatives of the Canadian/Unites States Wildlife Response Working Group for the Dixon Entrance (CANUSDIX WRWG) continued to work on the draft final *Canada-United States Marine Spill Pollution Contingency Plan, CANUSDIX Annex-Operations Appendix: Wildlife Response Guidelines*.
- DOI continued work with CANUSDIX WRWG members and U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) representatives on a series of activities to be held in Prince Rupert, BC during the week of 13 September 2001. Included were a wildlife working group meeting and a tabletop exercise that incorporated elements of the wildlife response guidelines. With support from South East Alaska Petroleum Response Organization (SEAPRO) and USCG, and with the assistance from the CCG and the Society for the Prevention to Animals representative in Prince Rupert, arrangements had been made for an International Bird Rescue Research Center representative to travel to Prince Rupert to provide a migratory bird capture and rehabilitation overview to everyone attending the Price Rupert activities and to help evaluate potential facilities in the Prince Rupert area that could be used for migratory bird treatment.
- Representatives from the following entities were planning to attend all or some of the wildlife related activities:
From Canada -- Environment Canada, Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Wildlife Service, Canadian Coast Guard, British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Lands, and Parks, Burrard Clean Operations, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, International fund for Animals, and the Prince Rupert Wildlife Rehabilitation Shelter.
From the United States -- DOI-OEPC, FWS, Alaska Department of Fish & Game, USCG, and SEAPRO.

Unfortunately, these activities were cancelled following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We plan to work with CG MSO Juneau and CGD17 to see what activities can be accomplished during the next calendar year to ensure these activities continue to go forward.

c. State/Federal/Tribal Trustee Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) Work Group.

(by Pamela Bergmann, DOI)

The NRDA Working Group met in July 2001 to continue discussing initiatives that will help enhance trustee NRDA capabilities. Representatives from the National Pollution Fund Center (NPFC) claims division will be making presentations at the upcoming *Alaska Forum on the Environment* workshop, which will be held the week of February 4th in Anchorage.

d. Sensitive Areas Working Group.

(by Doug Mutter, DOI and John Whitney, AK SSC)

- Mr. Mutter reviewed a table which summarized sensitive areas mapping/information for the Subarea Contingency Plans (SCPs). The sensitive area sections have been completed for each of the ten SCPs. The group is in the process of identifying additional sensitive sites. Two years ago, the ARRT asked the Sensitive Areas Working Group to develop GRSs for priority sensitive areas within each subarea and that work has been proceeding well. A total of 60 GRSs are currently being developed in Southeast.
- John Whitney (NOAA HAZMAT) reviewed progress on Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps. He explained the shoreline of Alaska totals more miles than all the shoreline of the Lower 48. Digital ESI maps of the Aleutian Islands, Kodiak Island, PWS, Southeast, and Northeast have been completed. In the next four years, the Western, Northwestern (Bristol Bay), and Southwestern (Chukchi Sea) coastlines of the state will be mapped. The cost of developing these maps is substantial. Funding will include grants and contributions from Native organizations, boroughs, etc. A booth will be operated at the *Alaska Forum for the Environment* with samples of all the data and maps generated to date.
- Mr. Mutter noted that the completed ESI maps are available in pdf format on the web at www.asgdc.state.ak.us/maps/cplans/subareas.html. A link to this site is also available on the ARRT website under the plans page.

4. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing, Exploration, & Development.

(by Tom Warren (DOI MMS))

The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is measured from 3 miles seaward to 200 miles offshore. MMS is responsible for managing leases of the OCS for exploration and development of oil and gas in an environmentally sound manner. To that end, MMS conducts hydrocarbon resource assessment, environmental studies, assessment, leasing, and regulatory compliance. MMS is currently developing a five-year oil and gas-leasing program for the nation. The program is currently at the point of review and comments are due in February 2002. The final plan should be submitted for Congressional and Executive review in April 2002.

Mr. Warren reviewed the planning areas into which the OCS has been divided for the purpose of management and planning. Three sales are authorized in the Beaufort Sea in 2003, 2005 and 2007. Four sales are authorized in the Chukchi Sea in 2004 and 2007. Two sales are authorized in Cook Inlet in 2004 and 2006. One sale is authorized for Norton Basin, but a new leasing system is being considered for that area. That leasing system would involve asking industry for expressions of interest in leasing and for public comment. If no industry interest is expressed, the matter will be closed. This process would recur on an annual basis until either the program terminates or industry expresses interest. If industry expresses interest, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) of the area would be done and a decision would be made whether or not to offer those acres for competitive sale or lease.

Current leasing activities are located primarily in the Beaufort Sea, where there are a total of 40 units. Mr. Warren reviewed activities at the various units in the Beaufort Sea, as well as at the Cosmopolitan unit in Cook Inlet.

Mr. Morris (NOAA) asked where one could locate maps for the other proposed leases around the country under the five-year plan. Mr. Warren replied that all information is available on the web at www.mms.gov.

5. TAPS Renewal Process.

(by Gary Riemer, DOI-BLM)

The TAPS renewal process is unique in that 375 miles of right-of-way are federal owned and 344 miles of right-of-way are state owned. The Joint Pipeline Office is a coordinated team and the renewal process is designed to meet the various agencies' requirements. Renewals typically do not involve an EIS. Under federal and Alaska renewal law, the owners of the pipeline have a right to renewal conditioned on compliance and commercial operation. However, because of the controversy and history of this project, a decision was made to support the renewal with an EIS. The federal government has two laws which govern renewal (Mineral Leasing Act and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act) and the State has one (AS 38.35). The language of these laws is similar. He noted that ownership along the pipeline also includes Native organizations and private landowners.

Mr. Riemer reviewed a flow chart of the process utilized with the renewal. Scoping has been completed to date and a contractor will help to develop the EIS. A summary of the public scoping comments has been compiled and was made available. The anticipated completion deadline for the project is December 2002.

Mr. Morris (NOAA) asked if this was the first renewal. Mr. Riemer replied it was not the first renewal for the pipeline. However, it is the first with a combined state/federal authorization, the first with an EIS, and the first renewal under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization (TAPA).

Ms. Holzinger (BIA) noted that the timeline between receipt and evaluation of public comments appears to be only one month. Mr. Riemer indicated that if necessary additional time will be taken to conduct the feedback process correctly. He asked for timeliness in agency comments.

Ms. Holzinger (BIA) further stated that she heard tribal governments or consortiums have been trying to develop working groups to assemble the expertise and understanding to deal with the draft EIS. She asked whether any information or comment had been received from them. Mr. Riemer replied that there are new

tribal coordination requirements in the executive order and the DOI-BLM is trying to work closely in consultation with tribal governments to explain the process. He anticipated that, before release of the EIS, a team of people would visit and coordinate with the tribal governments. Ms. Holzinger offered to provide contact information for the tribal groups. Mr. Riemer noted that the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) had sponsored a work group.

Mr. Morris (NOAA) asked whether any major changes to operations are anticipated as a result of the renewal process. Mr. Riemer was not aware of any proposals, but indicated the requirements upon industry regarding the operation of the pipeline are being reviewed. TAPA gave the Secretary the authority to add new requirements at any time in the right-of-way process, when deemed necessary. If the need for changes is discovered, those will be recommended.

Ms. Cameron (PS/BC OSTF) asked whether renewal would encompass the facility in Valdez. Mr. Riemer explained this renewal deals with right-of-way only. The terminal is on private land, so there is no leasing renewal activity is associated with it. However, under law, DOI-BLM also oversees the entire system, which includes the Valdez terminal and Pump Station 1. Therefore the EIS portion will cover the marine terminal.

6. NPR-A Leasing, Exploration, & Development - Update.

(by Gene Terland, DOI-BLM)

Mr. Terland distributed a publication entitled *NPR-A Update, Issue 8 December 2001*. He displayed a map of the NPR-A and reported on mapping and leasing. Recent leasing has involved 133 tracts.

During 1999-2000, Phillips Exploration drilled 3-4 wells and last summer announced a discovery. In the near future, Phillips plans to drill 5 wells and Anadarko plans to drill 3 wells in this area. It is anticipated that an application for oilfield development may be received from Philips next summer, depending on the results of exploration this winter. Tracts not sold in the first lease sale will be re-offered; the sale is scheduled for June 2002. An environmental compliance review is being done at this time that will result in an updated EIS.

Notice of intent was published in the Federal Register to conduct an integrated activity plan and an EIS on the northwest planning area of NPR-A. Scoping meetings began this week. DOI-BLM is also requesting industry's level of interest in the northwest planning area, which will close on 31 December 2001. There is a two-year schedule for the land use plan for the northwest area. The southern area process will follow the northwest EIS.

Mr. Lautenberger (EPA) asked when Phillips might apply for full field development. Mr. Terland anticipated the NEPA process would encompass a two-year period, so construction would not occur for at least two to three years.

7. Unified Plan - Reformat, CD-ROM, & Website.

(by CDR Jean Butler, CGD17)

- CDR Butler noted that following the events of September 11th there have been numerous questions about the planning and response information which is readily available on the ARRT website. With this in mind, the USCG reviewed the plans on the website and decided to remove the HAZMAT, Resource, and Scenario sections from the Unified Plan and ten Subarea Contingency Plans. Notes were placed in the online documents that indicate how the removed information can be requested. To ensure that ARRT member agencies would still have access to the information a CD-ROM of the website, which included the removed sections, was developed and distributed during the meeting. Additional copies are available upon request from the ARRT coordinator.
- During the same timeframe the USCG completed a project to electronically scan all copies MOUs/MOAs which are sited in the Unified plan (20 separate documents in all). Previous to this, these documents were only available by photo copying a paper copy of the original. The original documents no longer exist in electronic form due to the outdated software systems with which they were created. The documents were scanned as pdf files and posted to the ARRT website and included on the CD-ROM.

8. Unified Plan & SubArea Plans – Update Schedule.

(by Larry Iwamoto, ADEC)

Mr. Iwamoto distributed a handout showing the status of the Unified Plan and the Subarea Contingency Plans (SCPs), as well as a draft Statewide Geographic Response Strategies (GRSs) development plan (i.e. planning for 60 GRSs in Southeast, 61 GRSs in Cook Inlet, and 20 GRS in Prince William Sound (PWS)). He indicated there is ongoing discussion regarding whether to go forward with Change 3 to the Unified Plan, which was last updated in September of 1999. He reviewed a map outlining the boundaries of the ten SCPs and summarized the planned changes as follows:

- ◆ The Northwest Arctic, Bristol Bay, and Western Alaska SCPs have been completed and posted to the ARRT website since the last meeting.
- ◆ Change 1 to the Southeast SCP, which involves GRSs and other updates, will commence next spring.
- ◆ Change 2 for PWS will involve GRSs and other updates.
- ◆ Change 1 for Cook Inlet will involve GRSs and other updates.
- ◆ Change 1 for Kodiak recently completed the public review process. 18 new GRSs were developed for the Kodiak update.
- ◆ No changes are anticipated in the near future for the Aleutian, North Slope, and Interior SCPs.

9. OSRI Dispersant Project.

(by Walter Cox, OSRI)

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 established the Oil Spill Recovery Institute (OSRI) as a research and development institute. OSRI is publicly funded through a \$23 million endowment that generates \$1 million annually for program purposes. OSRI focuses on oil spill impacts, prevention, preparedness and response. OSRI has been operating since 1996 and is administered by the Prince William Sound (PWS) Science Center in Cordova.

Mr. Cox reviewed the *Dispersion Impact Analysis project* that was begun this year. During the project, physical impacts will be examined quantitatively and biological impacts will be qualitatively analyzed. The physical analysis will involve surface spreading, emulsification, dissolution, evaporation, deposition, degrading, and recovery. Biological analysis will involve population, distribution, spill-induced mortality, and reproductive impacts.

He displayed a screen shot of output from the Oil Spill Contingency and Response (OSCAR) model, which will be further developed during the project. OSCAR is a three-dimensional oil spill model that examines impacts on and below the ocean surface. The components of OSCAR are a plume trajectory model, an oil weathering model, and a tactical response model. Mr. Cox reviewed interactions among atmospheric and oceanographic models and conducted a sample run of the OSCAR model using a hypothetical spill scenario.

He explained that the project will rely heavily on stakeholder participation and that a Stakeholder Committee will be established to organize inputs from all interested entities.

Future efforts will include assessment of stakeholder interest, formal establishment of the Stakeholder Committee, formal establishment of a Science Oversight Committee, development of an execution plan, runs of specified simulations, and reviews of the evolving process.

Mr. Hahn (ADEC) indicated OSRI's board agreed to move ahead with this project approximately one month ago and it is very conceptual at this time. The board saw this as an opportunity to pull together data that has been compiled over the past few years. He noted that linking biological with physical data is challenging. One of the benefits of the project is to educate people so they understand the potential impacts associated with dispersion from a scientific approach. Substantial outreach will be required in this effort.

Mr. Thompson (BP) noted that the OSRI board was discussing the possibility of the National Academy of Science providing oversight of the project in order to ensure accuracy and public acceptance.

Mr. Mutter (DOI) suggested the ARRT might consider the possibility that the project may provide useful information for the Science and Technology Committee to consider in refining pre-approved dispersion zones.

Dr. Whitney (NOAA) suggested the use of a mechanical model to compare not only dispersed versus non-dispersed information, but other response techniques as well. Mr. Cox indicated that OSCAR does have a tactical response component.

Ms. Bergmann (DOI) asked if OSRI is seeking ARRT's support of the project at this point in the process. Mr. Cox responded that OSRI is interested in comments on the overall project and its design.

CAPT Hutmacher (MSO Anchorage) was interested in what type of peer review will be done before the project's work is developed. Mr. Cox recognized the importance of the project being done correctly; to ensure the project and OSRI credibility in the subject. **Ed Thompson (BP)** noted that, if the National Academy of Sciences says the project does not produce accurate information, it will not proceed. In addition, if gaps are identified, the gaps must be addressed before the project is released. **Brad Hahn (ADEC)** explained that, if the scientific analysis indicates this project is valuable, it could be a tool for public education. It might lead to a re-evaluation of the Dispersant Use Guidelines for PWS. He also stressed that the project must have absolute scientific credibility. He acknowledged there would be issues in the use of the model, such as what efficiency factors to use, salinity, cold water, etc. He believed the model would help the understanding of stakeholders regarding trade-offs in the use of dispersants. Mr. Cox reemphasized the importance of overall stakeholder involvement in this project.

Dr. Whitney (NOAA) suggested the NOAA HAZMAT group conduct a scientific review before a review is requested by the National Academy of Science.

10. West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Analysis.

(by Jean Cameron, Pacific States/British Columbia OSTF)

Ms. Cameron explained that the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force (PS/BC OSTF) co-sponsored the *West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Analysis* project with the USCG. The work group adopted a project goal of providing recommendations for an offshore vessel traffic scheme for the West Coast that would prevent environmental damage. Ms. Cameron reviewed a list of the 38 members of the work group. The geographic range of the project was from Cook Inlet, to the north, to San Diego, in the south. A variety of vessel types were considered and various types of data were collected to determine risk factors (e.g. traffic patterns, arrival data, existing routing measures, exclusion zones and sanctuaries, drift analysis based on wind speed, casualty analysis, assist vessels, etc.). Ms. Cameron reviewed individual data sets, how the data was collected, who was involved in data collection, and how the data was used.

The information gathered by the work group was used in two risk analysis models. The first was the Tug Response/Drift Rate Analysis, which resulted essentially in a zone that defined the minimum and maximum distances from shore at which a vessel could be reached in a timely manner. Another model focused on defining high risk zones based on available information for volume of oil transported, vessel design, areas of higher collision hazards, distance offshore, seasonal variables, coastal route density, historic casualty information, and environmental sensibility. Members of each region ultimately calculated relative risk indexes. For Alaska, 11 scenarios were developed. Ms. Cameron reviewed the Alaska higher risk scenario for a fish processor.

The risk factors were eventually narrowed down to four categories: distance offshore, higher collision rates, tug availability, and historic casualty rates. Ms. Cameron summarized the findings generated in relation to these four factors:

Distance Offshore.

1. Higher risk of drift grounding exists within 25 nautical miles of land. Recommend voluntary vessel transits of at least 25 nautical miles offshore.
2. High risk areas were identified with regard to nine factors: volume of oil/vessel design, drift, collisions, distance offshore, weather/seasonal, tug availability, route density, historical information, and environmental sensitivity. Recommend these areas be depicted on nautical charts and publications.
3. Many tanker organizations already have policies which are in compliance with these recommendations. Recommend expanded outreach programs to include non-members.

Higher Collision Rates.

1. Higher traffic density naturally exists at port entrances. Recommend HSCs (or their equivalent) continuously monitor the risk and evaluate the need for enhanced traffic safety systems.
2. AIS is supposed to be fully implemented by 2008. When fully implemented, it could significantly reduce collision hazards in areas of relatively high traffic density. Recommend the maritime and towing industry consider implementing AIS in advance of the required schedule.
3. Different ballast water exchange standards may cause navigation hazards. Recommend USCG, in consultation with the Fisheries & Oceans Canada and Transport Canada, adopt a single set of offshore exchange standards which are consistent with those of IMO.

Tug Availability.

1. 77 out of 182 West Coast tugs are capable of severe weather rescues. Rescue capabilities have improved greatly over recent years with the construction and placement of numerous state-of-the-art tugs with greater horsepower, maneuverability, and high tech equipment.
2. Based on tug capabilities, a rescue tug is not likely to prevent a drift grounding during severe weather if the distressed vessel is within a range of 36-216 miles offshore, depending upon the exact location along the coast. Recommend US and Canadian Coast Guards issue Broadcast Notices to Mariners (BNMs) during severe weather, which would advise vessels to stay a safe distance offshore as defined by the project's response-time analysis.
3. Currently 100+ tugs carry transponders in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound, with 30-50 additional tugs that could be added. Recommend AWO encourage its member companies to become participants (installation costs = \$3,000). The primary benefit is to enhance capability to determine which tug is in the best position to provide assistance.
4. The coastwise signal tracking system for tug transponders could be improved by adding up to nine additional signal receiving stations (i.e. 2 in Oregon and 7 in California). Recommend that the USCG, States of Oregon & California, industry, and marine exchanges coordinate a cost benefit analysis to install new stations.
5. Areas of low rescue tug availability still exist. Off the Queen Charlotte Islands and in the Gulf of Alaska are two examples. Recommended options include: investment in a dedicated rescue tug, creation of a stand-by tug fund, or adoption of regulations requiring rescue tug contracts by vessel owners.

Historical Casualties.

1. Most casualties take place near major ports due to higher traffic density, ships conducting tests of steering and propulsion systems (12 hours prior to entering US waters), etc. Recommend adoption of similar standards of care by ports along the West Coast.
2. TAPS tankers suffer the most structural fractures, which is to be expected due to operating in harsh Alaskan

waters. TAPS tankers are also subject to very stringent inspections and reporting standards. Recommend that the double hull replacements be expedited and that USCG inspections continue.

3. Cargo/freight vessels had the highest number of casualties but the lowest overall casualty rate, due to the large number of vessels in the category. The casualty rate was 0.054%.
4. The highest casualty rate existed for fishing vessels at 0.384%, which is seven times greater than that of the cargo/freight vessels. Recommend that the USCG Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Action Plan be implemented (it is available in the Apr-Jun 2001 issue of the Marine Safety Council on page 61). The State of Washington's inspection program is also a good example.
5. Casualty rate reductions should be anticipated as a result of the implementation of the International Management code for the safe operation of ships, pollution prevention, and amendments to the convention on standards for training, certification, and watchkeeping.

The project also found that casualty data was not standardized. A recommendation was made that USCG and NTSB incorporate more standardized fields in their casualty data. Another finding was that vessel transit data is not standardized. A recommendation was made to compile better information on vessel types, cargo, and last port of call.

The PS/BC OSTF and USCG recommended re-visiting this issue in five years. Ms. Cameron indicated she would continue to conduct public outreach. The final work group meeting will occur in April 2002 and the final project report will be issued this summer.

11. BP PWS Tanker Drill (May 2002).

(by Ed Thompson, BP)

Mr. Thompson reviewed plans for a drill to be conducted by BP in May 2002. The scenario will start on day 4 of a large incident occurring in Prince William Sound. The drill will be focused on logistics, particularly setting up a logistics base in Whittier. The drill is also intended to evaluate the USCG's Regional Incident Command (RIC) interactions with BP's Crisis Management Team (CMT). In addition, BP is in the process of creating guidelines for a Regional Stakeholder Committee (RSC), which will be incorporated into the drill.

Preparations will involve a series of workshops, which will be held in Anchorage throughout the winter and spring. Three incident action plans will be developed during the workshops to cover the first three days of the scenario. The exercise will consist of an Incident Management Team (IMT) tabletop at the VEOC in Valdez and a concurrent field deployment at the logistics base in Whittier. Headquarter cells for BP, ADEC, and CGD17 will be invited to participate remotely to exercise the RIC/CMT interaction.

Ms. Bergmann (DOI) asked whether the drill would be focused only on PWS. Mr. Thompson stated the drill would encompass PWS and outside PWS to Kodiak.

12. FEMA Response to Terrorist Events.

(by Mike Hammond, FEMA Region X)

Mr. Hammond distributed hard copies of the monthly Region X newsletter titled *HAZMAT Update*, which includes current information on terrorism planning. He indicated that the newsletter could also be transmitted to interested people via e-mail and is available on-line at: <http://www.fema.gov/reg-x/haznwsltr.htm>.

He displayed several of FEMA's terrorism periodicals; a pocket guide; a bioterrorism syndrome chart; a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) quick agent reference guide; and a brochure on an integrated emergency management course entitled *Managing Emergency Consequences of Terrorism*.

He explained there are many unanswered questions regarding how FEMA would interact with the new Office of Homeland Security.

FEMA's authority comes from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which was recently updated. Their direction comes from Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 and PDD 62. FEMA policy supports the position that local or state governments retain control of emergency operations in a terrorist event, as in other types of emergencies.

Many of FEMA's preparations for terrorism response began with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. He reviewed several major lessons learned from the event:

- ◆ Clarify lines of authority, roles, and responsibilities
- ◆ Establish early operating priorities and information flow with the FBI
- ◆ Focused attention on responder health and safety
- ◆ Importance of Urban Search and Rescue and other emergency services functions for mass casualty

Responding to terrorism involves *concurrent* crisis management (FBI-led) and consequence management (FEMA-led). FBI and FEMA have separate areas of authority, but each can make decisions that impact the other. The overall lead federal agency may change, but the lead for consequence management stays with FEMA. Pre-event, FEMA obtains approval from the FBI on actions that would affect FBI efforts to resolve a crisis. Post-event, FEMA coordinates with the FBI.

The *Federal Response Plan (FRP)* describes other federal agency responsibilities for assistance when state and local capabilities are overwhelmed. The FRP explains the role of the Federal Coordinating Officer and organizes each response into 12 functional areas. The Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP is available online at www.fema.gov/r-n-r/frp/frpterr.htm.

Under the FRP, other agencies involved in terrorism response and their responsibilities include:

DOJ/FBI	Crisis management
FEMA	Consequence management
DOD	Civil support
DOE	Nuclear/radiological accidents
DHHS	Public health emergencies (epidemic/pandemic)

EPA Hazardous materials accidents

Currently, there are 28 Urban Search and Rescue task forces in the country, one of which is in Puget Sound. These task forces are capable of a multitude of functions and operate 24 hours per day.

Mr. Hammond next briefly reviewed the mission assignment process, which is generated by requests for assistance.

Mr. Lautenberger remarked on the quick escalation of requests to EPA that occurred in association with the events of September 11th. He also asked whether FEMA anticipates major revisions to the Terrorism Incident Annex because of the creation of the Office of Homeland Security. Mr. Hammond indicated this is being discussed and he suspected there would be revisions.

13. NSF Response to Terrorist Events.

(by CDR Merrie Austin, CG PST)

CDR Austin stated the National Strike Force (NSF) followed normal operating procedures in responding to the events of September 11th and that the Incident Command System (ICS) was heavily used in executing their activities. She explained that the NSF is comprised of three teams, which were rotated into the response. All members of the teams have the same training and all follow the same standard operating procedures (SOPs) which facilitated the relief process. CDR Austin presented a photographic account of the NSF's activities during the response and relayed her observations.

Since the EPA is the lead agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #10 under the FRP and COTP New York was busy doing port security functions, it was agreed the EPA would take the lead for HAZMAT response in the coastal zone for this event. EPA conducted air monitoring in New York in the general vicinity of the workers, as well as some distance away to see how far the gasses had migrated. Air monitoring was conducted at the World Trade Center (WTC) primarily for explosive gasses. EPA also generated an activities mapping of stationary asbestos air sampling locations for the Lower Manhattan area.

She explained that NSF members were involved with escorting people back into the buildings affected during the attacks in order to recover items such as hard drives, paperwork, etc. to re-start Wall Street operations. While performing this duty she noted many responders were not wearing respiratory protection and commented on the potentially tragic long-term effects of this. She stated that it was difficult to communicate hazard findings and enforce protection measures to the various response agencies on-scene.

The NSF strike force was also involved in the decontamination of workers. There was asbestos in both WTC towers that the EPA wished to ensure it did not migrate off-site. Unfortunately, washing stations for workers were voluntary. EPA also set up a vehicle wash to decontaminate vehicles as they left the site. It was also not consistently utilized or enforced. HEPA vacuums were used to clean the sidewalks. There was a great deal of air and water outfall sampling that involved checking for valuables, as well as hazardous materials.

The Freshkills Landfill was not previously operated as a hazardous landfill, yet debris from the WTC was taken there. Seagulls removing items from the landfill became an issue. This was addressed by bringing in scare

cannons. CDR Austin outlined the sorting operations at the landfill. She explained that personal hygiene stations at the landfill, similar to those at Ground Zero; took over a week to get going. Air monitoring was also initiated along the fence line at the landfill to check for asbestos spreading to nearby housing units.

The command post for ESF#10 was at the regional EPA headquarters in Edison. Responders also used the NSF's Mobile Incident Command Post that was setup at Ground Zero for on-scene coordination. CDR Austin commented on the value of these mobile command posts.

CDR Austin reviewed an organizational chart of the ESF#10 unified command structure, as well as an operations organizational chart.

CDR Austin reviewed several NSF lessons learned from the response efforts:

- ◆ The Incident Command System (ICS) was effective and efficient.
- ◆ Information is power and sharing information is *more* powerful.
- ◆ Ego management was necessary.
- ◆ Avoid ESF mission creep and stay focused on what you are charged with addressing.
- ◆ ESF should focus on providing support to the local authorities, not taking over the response.
- ◆ Politics that occur during a response may be frustrating and difficult to understand, voice concerns but then let it go.

Mr. Lautenberger (EPA) indicated there was a major clash of cultures between emergency response branches and the Superfund enforcers; that clash is yet to be resolved.

Mr. Hammond (FEMA) commented on the past adversarial relationship FEMA had experienced with the FBI with regard to ICS. Fortunately it was rectified approximately one year ago.

CDR Austin noted there was a need for better communication among EPA's OSCs.

Mr. Lautenberger explained that the OSCs are typically autonomous in the various regions. In recent years, the National OSC Task Force has been trying to establish ICS as a standard system for crisis management. Many organizations on the west coast have been using ICS for years, but that is not the case on the east coast. The September 11th event has been an eye opener for those on the east coast. He noted that 50% of EPA's On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) compliment was at the WTC at one time or another.

A question was asked whether an Incident Action Plan (IAP) was done for each ESF. CDR Austin replied that an IAP was done for her operation, but she was not sure what was done with others.

Mr. Hahn (ADEC) commented that he heard a presentation by an early responder to the WTC event and he noted that one of the striking things was the level chaos on the site. There was no site control for the first few days until perimeter fences were erected.

Mr. Hammond (FEMA) noted there was no checklist for an event such as September 11th.

14. Homeland Security Issues - AK OSCs' Perspectives.

(Federal and State OSCs)

Mr. Lautenberger (EPA) commented on a recent article in the *Anchorage Daily News* by General Phil Oates entitled, "Alaska Must be Prepared for Terror." That article offered a commentary on the Alaskan terror policy cabinet budget request to the Legislature. Much of that budget relates to emergency preparedness, as well as response.

CAPT Davin (CGD17) commented that life has changed substantially for the USCG since September 11th. Homeland Security is now one of the primary focuses, rising substantially on the list of items with which the USCG deal with daily basis. Initially, many thought this would pass and things would go back to normal, but there is now no expectation for that to happen. He indicated the USCG is rapidly running out of money and is waiting for Congress to give additional funds. The USCG will now become more of a player in bioterrorism, where it was not previously. He stated operations have probably changed the most in Valdez in terms of overseeing the terminal and tankers going in and out of port.

CDR Coleman (MSO Valdez) discussed deterrence, which is the focus of the USCG in Valdez. He noted there is an obvious strategic national interest in Alyeska's operation in Valdez. Since September 11th, the USCG has been building a deterrence capability, in partnership with Alyeska's corporate security people, shipping companies, the Valdez police, the Alaska State Troopers, the National Guard, the Army, NORAD, ALCOM, the Navy, and others. At the same time, the USCG is continuing its other missions. He stated the USCG has had an increase in personnel; 20 reservists were called up and sent to Valdez and he anticipated 15 more would be assigned to his unit in the next few months. He indicated there has been continuous cutter coverage in PWS, which is difficult to achieve. There are also frequent and random overflights of PWS, the terminal, and its environs by the Civil Air Patrol. There is currently one 25-foot patrol boat in Valdez and the hope to obtain one to two more patrol boats in the January-February time frame. He stated a healthy law enforcement intelligence network has been developed that has been very useful.

CDR Ohnstad (MSO Juneau) noted the end of the cruise season was three weeks away when September 11th occurred. Cruise ships are required to have security plans approved by the USCG National Maritime Center. After September 11th, the cruise industry had to implement those plans nationwide. A security boarding was performed on every cruise ship that called on Southeast during that month. The USCG received positive feedback from cruise ship passengers. Some holes in dock security were discovered and that is being addressed. The USCG is also doing security patrols and will continue to run security drills on cruise ships. The involvement of people outside of major ports is being solicited, including harbormasters, marine pilots, police, etc. Over flights and waterway patrols will be done periodically. Proactive attempts will be made to detect problems and deter acts of terrorism.

CAPT Hutmacher (MSO Anchorage) stated that many of the same measures as CDR Ohnstad and CDR Coleman mentioned have been initiated in Anchorage. The USCG is working closely with terminal and vessel operators and the Port of Anchorage. A close look has been taken at industrial facilities and their safety. The USCG is trying to include all agencies and entities that might help prevent a terrorism act.

Mr. Lautenberger (EPA) stated most EPA OSCs were not familiar with bioterrorism at the time of the events

on the East Coast. EPA is not a law enforcement agency for terrorism; it is a law enforcement agency for environmental issues. As such, EPA has a technical support capability for law enforcement. EPA is involved in training for HAZMAT teams in Alaska. The EPA does have a role in consequence management. The NRT is in the midst of putting out guidelines for dealing with anthrax and bioterrorism. All agencies that are part of the federal response system have a role in dealing with bioterrorism. Alaska has been fortunate, but should not consider itself immune to activities that have occurred in the east and around the country. Mr. Lautenberger indicated he and Mr. Carr recently received two days of anthrax training in Seattle. He remarked on the impressive support that is available from the National Guard's Civil Support Team, which will support civil authorities in WMD scenarios. This resource will also help improve capabilities to deal with HAZMAT incidents.

Mr. Carr (EPA) added that Administrator Whitman has stated, that because of the events following the September 11th attacks, that EPA is now in the business of counter-terrorism. He was aware there are plans being drafted for submission to OMB to have that function funded. He noted that, like the USCG, counter-terrorism was a lower priority for the EPA in the past.

LCol Gingras (ACE) stated his agency has incorporated lessons learned from the events. Construction done by the ACE now has force protection factors to incorporate. The ACE is offering a capability to do force protection analysis of existing structures. They are also offering a course during January 2002 oriented at designers and security managers.

Mr. Hahn (ADEC) stated that the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has been heavily taxed in Alaska, recently responding to many anthrax reports. The Homeland Security Bill put forward by Governor Knowles is a \$97 million package. That package will be reviewed by Legislature in January 2002. That budget proposes funding to be split 50/50 federal and state. The bill includes four new HAZMAT teams. The cost to maintain these teams will be high. The bill also includes drills, training, and decontamination equipment. He noted that \$40 million in the Governor's proposed Homeland Security Bill would go to the Land Mobile Radio System, which is an important communication package. The system would provide complete coverage throughout the state.

Mr. Eklof (Navy Region NW) noted that because of high priority materials in the Puget Sound area, the Navy has asked the USCG to perform escort duties. He stressed that the holidays are coming up and complacent attitudes should not prevail. He suggested that people be at their highest alert. He noted that ten years ago during the Cold War operational security was important and that concept is back in the forefront again. He suggested that people report anything that is out of place.

Ms. Bergmann (DOI) indicated her office in Alaska realized there were communication gaps during September 11th, so they have developed a terrorism annex to their internal disaster plan which focuses on communications. The DOI is taking the opportunity to make sure, on an individual employee and a department level, that people know what to do in the event of a terrorism event.

Mr. Morris (NOAA) stated his agency is performing an inventory of all its capabilities to outline that which can be brought to bear in the event of a particular type of emergency response. NOAA has also been communicating with the FBI's HAZMAT response unit. Through an agreement with USCG headquarters, NOAA is using a list of 47 commercial chemical agents of concern to develop a list of worst-case scenarios.

Mr. Mullins (ACE) stated that ACE has secure communications for sensitive law enforcement information. If there is a need to communicate between the FBI and another federal center, ACE can support it.

15. Open Comments – Attendees.

Dr. Whitney (AK SSC) stated that Gary Hufford (NWS) asked to relay that NOAA is committed to installing seven new buoys along the coast of Southeast Alaska; four have been installed and three others will be installed next summer. The NWS is expanding its NOAA radio capabilities significantly in PWS and Southeast Alaska. The NWS is also training their meteorologists and making them available for emergency response efforts. They have adopted several new air dispersion models.

Ms. Holzinger (BIA) shared her appreciation for the ARRT group. She explained that, as the only environmental person at BIA, the ARRT meetings are great for her to be able keep up on these types of issues. She indicated she would become more active participant in the future.

16. Closing Remarks.
(Co-Chairs)

Mr. Lautenberger (EPA) thanked new members for attending the meeting.

CAPT Davin (CGD17) remarked on the excellent exchange of information at this meeting. He expressed appreciation for the efforts of presenters.

Mr. Deely (CGD17) indicated the next ARRT meeting would be held in May 2002 in Juneau.

Adjournment: The meeting was adjourned at 4:37 P.M.